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Riverbend, Hadia (HNK), Souad, and Huda, all of whom offered me their time 
and encouragement; Especially Badia, Ansom, Farida and Hanan, whose stories 
broke my heart. 
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Introduction 
 The recent wave of uprisings began in Baghdad on October 1, 2019 to express discontent 
over the dismissal of a popular military officer who helped uproot the so-called “Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria,” or ISIL.1 Over the next few days, demonstrations took place in many of Iraq’s 
largest cities, where women and men called for higher wages, better public services, and an end 
to the corrupt government installed by the US after it invaded in 2003.2 By October 10, Iraqi 
security forces had killed over one hundred protesters and injured well over four thousand, but 
the government made no other response.3 Iraqis went home and regrouped, but by late October 
the protests resumed, this time taking control of downtown Baghdad.4 Prime Minister Adel 
Abdul Mahdi submitted his resignation a month later. 5 There appeared to be a revolution in 
progress. 
 Ban, a 25 year-old from Baghdad, was among the many women shaping the movement. 
She told Rudaw, a news outlet based in Iraqi Kurdistan,  
For the first time, I feel a sense of belonging to this country, the importance of my 
existence, and that the revolution needs all of us… For women, this revolution is 
not only against the government, but also against the tribal and religious systems 
that limit women’s role in society.6 
 
1 There are many names associated with this group, including its Arabic acronym, Da‘esh, and its most popular 
acronym, ISIS. To make this paper both as accurate and as accessible as possible, I have chosen to use ISIL because 
it is likely more familiar to my readers than “Daesh.” In addition, the translation “Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant,” which corresponds to ISIL, is more accurate than “Iraq and Syria,” which corresponds to ISIS. This is 
because the Arabic word “al-Shams” refers not to Syria the nation-state, but Syria as a region, or what we call the 
“Levant” in English.  
2 Zahra Ali, “Iraqis Demand a Country,” Middle East Report 292 no. 3 (Fall/Winter 2019), accessed January 4, 
2020, https://merip.org/2019/12/iraqis-demand-a-country/.  
3 “Iraq: Lethal Force Used Against Protesters,” Human Rights Watch, October 10, 2019, accessed April 7, 2020, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/10/iraq-lethal-force-used-against-protesters. 
4 Z. Ali, “Iraqis.” 
5 Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraq Prime Minister Pressed to Quit as Protests Clog Streets,” New York Times, October 30, 2019, 
accessed April 7, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/world/middleeast/iraq-protests-prime-
minister.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article; Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraqi Prime Minister Resigns 
in Deepening Political Crisis,” New York Times, November 30, 2019, accessed April 10, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/30/world/middleeast/adel-abdul-mahdi-resigns-iraq.html. 
6 “Nisā’ Saḥat Taḥrīr fī Baghdād yaksrun ḥājaz alkhūf wa yantifaḍun ’alā alqiyyūd” Rudaw, November 11, 2019, 
accessed February 28, 2020, https://www.rudaw.net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/131120191. 
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Ban was born in the 1990s, when Iraq’s economy began to collapse under the pressure of 
international sanctions imposed by the US. As a child, Ban’s family may have struggled from a 
shortage of basic goods and services, like medicine and education, or food and clean water.7  Ban 
came of age in the 2000s as the US occupied Iraq, sending the nation into even worse economic 
conditions, installing a corrupt regime, and pushing the country towards civil war.8 Not long 
after the US withdrew from Iraq, Ban lived through a third major crisis. In 2014 ISIL rapidly 
expanded and took control of large parts of Iraqi territory through genocidal warfare.9 These 
decades of war and instability touched the lives of every Iraqi, and had gender-specific impacts 
on women, who were forced to find means of survival and resistance.  
 Between 1990 and 2019, the US, various repressive governments, and extremist militias 
subjected Iraqi women to extreme poverty, political marginalization, health crises, displacement, 
and other forms of violence. From 1990-2002, after destroying most of Iraq’s civilian 
infrastructure during Operation Desert Storm, the US used its dominant position in the UN to 
subject Iraq to the most comprehensive set of sanctions the world had ever seen.10 In response, 
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein (r. 1979-2003) implemented policies that dismantled the welfare 
state, which women had previously relied on for jobs, healthcare, and legal protections.11 In 2003 
the US invaded Iraq, destroying more infrastructure, dismantling most of its governing 
institutions, and subjecting Iraqis to violent economic policies that accelerated Iraq’s economic 
 
7 Yasmin Husein al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq: The Gender Impact of International Sanctions, (Lynne Rienner 
Publications, 2008), 2-7. 
8 Zahra Ali, Women and Gender in Iraq: Between Nation-Building and Fragmentation, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 131. 
9 Fawaz Gerges, ISIS: A History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 1-4. 
10 A-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 2-7. 
11 Zahra Ali, Women and Gender in Iraq, 118-9.  
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collapse.12 A By the 2010s, the corruption and incompetence of the US and new Iraqi political 
elite had created many of the conditions necessary for the rise of ISIL.13 This extremist group 
took women as sex slaves, killed men who refused to convert their distorted version of Islam, 
and occupied Iraqi territory for several years.14 Throughout these recurring crises, Iraqi women 
found ways to survive and resist the constant and ever-changing violence against them. 
 This thesis investigates Iraqi women’s history since 1990. It argues that, in the past three 
decades, Iraqi women have not been silent victims of US imperialism, the repression of the Iraqi 
state, or ISIL’s extremism. Instead, they have resisted these forms of violence with visible 
agency, deploying tools of economic survival, political activism, creative writing, and armed 
resistance. Iraqi society underwent dramatic changes in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and in each 
decade Iraqi women faced violence specific to that period. This thesis argues that Iraqi women’s 
resistance adapted to the changing circumstances of each decade, sometimes through slight shifts 
and other times by forging new means of resistance.  
I seek to avoid essentializing Iraqi women through an intersectional analysis of their 
actions. While religion, ethnicity, class, location, and a myriad of other factors all affected the 
ways Iraqi women responded to the violence of US imperialism, state repression, and ISIL’s 
extremism, it is possible to identify trends in their shared resistance. In chapters one and two, 
class divisions are the most visible intersections, with low-income women resisting through their 
survival, and middle-class women sharing their stories through writing or joining political 
organizations. In chapter three, ethnicity, religion, and location are the most prominent 
intersections because ISIL targeted religious minorities and did not control the entirety of Iraq. In 
 
12 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 293-304; Zahra Ali, Women 
and Gender in Iraq, 135. 
13 Gerges, ISIS, 99-106; 109-14. 
14 Ibid., 30-33. 
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this case women living under ISIL finding ways to escape, and Kurdish women volunteering to 
fight ISIL on the front lines. 
Literature Review 
The historiography of women in the modern Iraqi nation-state advances post-colonial 
analyses that contextualize Iraqi women’s experiences across time and space. It investigates the 
legacy of British imperialism, the construction and collapse of the welfare state under Saddam 
Hussein, the rise of political Islams,15 and argues for the existence of a unique Iraqi politics.16 
Historians of Iraqi women typically begin during the British mandate period of 1920-32, when 
the British legal code made Iraqi women second-class citizens.17 Then they move to the British-
installed Hashemite Monarchy of 1932-58, during which the modern Iraqi women’s rights 
movement materialized.18 Under the first post-colonial republic of 1958-68, major reforms were 
made in Iraq, especially in regards to women’s rights, and historians tend to examine the role 
women played in politics during this period.19 This historical context is certainly important to 
scholarly analysis Iraqi women in more recent years, but a deeper discussion of the Iraqi 
women’s rights movement is outside the scope of a thesis of this length. Therefore, I will begin 
my historiographical discussion in earnest with women under the Ba‘th regime.  
Historian Charles Tripp argues in A History of Iraq that the dictatorship of Saddam 
Hussein was characterized by violent repression on a scale previously unseen in Iraq. Saddam 
Hussein’s rise to power began in 1968, when the Iraqi Ba‘th Party took control of the 
 
15 The inclusion of an “s” at the end of Islam acknowledges that this religion means different things to different 
people. Islam is not a monolith; Thus, I use its plural form. This will be true of many terms throughout this thesis.  
16 Tripp, Iraq, 281; Z. Ali, Women and Gender in Iraq, 17. 
17 Noga Efrati, Women in Iraq: Past Meets Present, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 20-7. 
18 Ibid., 166; Z. Ali, Women and Gender in Iraq, 56-60. 
19 Nadje al-Ali and Nicole Pratt, What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press), 26-7. 
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government and his uncle, Hassan al-Bakr, was named president.20 As noted by Tripp, the Ba‘th 
Party, originally from Syria, had been in Iraq since 1951. It was a pan-Arab group, which meant 
it promoted unity among the Arab-majority nation states that were created after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. It advocated for socialism, though not communism. It was a secular group, 
though not atheistic, meaning it sought to use socialist policies to address inequalities among 
both Sunni and Shi‘a Arabs.21 However, Tripp argues that, as Saddam Hussein consolidated 
power during the 1970s, the Ba‘th Party became no more than an instrument used to repress 
dissent and demand obedience.22 
In her sociological study Women in Iraq, Yasmin Husein al-Jawaheri argues that, in the 
1970s and ‘80s, Saddam Hussein and his Arab-socialist Ba’th Party constructed a welfare state 
that incorporated women into the economy.23 Through revenue from the nationalized oil 
industry, it provided them with the region’s best education,24 and workplace benefits like daycare 
and paid maternity leave. However, al-Jawaheri also argues that the regime’s inclusionary 
policies were directly tied to its economic situation, so they were always liable to change or 
disappear entirely.25 Sociologist Zahra Ali, in her book Women and Gender in Iraq, builds on al-
Jawaheri’s analysis. She argues that, during this same period, Saddam Hussein constructed a 
“neopatriarchal state” in which he was the fatherly leader.26 Through the policies described by 
al-Jawaheri, he attempted to replace localized forms of governance and patriarchy. New laws and 
reforms diminished the power of feudal and tribal power structures, especially in rural areas.27 I 
 
20 Tripp, Iraq, 186-88. 
21 Tripp, Iraq, 138. 
22 Ibid., 190-91. 
23 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 16-7; 28-9. 
24 Tripp, Iraq, 200-7 (this citation only in reference to the claim that Iraq offered the region’s best education). 
25 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 16-7; 28-9. 
26 Z. Ali, Women and Gender in Iraq, 118.  
27 Ibid., 90-96. 
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agree with these authors, and will use this important historical background to investigate the 
transformations that took place in Iraq during the ‘90s, specifically the collapse of the welfare 
state and policies that re-distributed power back to tribal and religious leaders.  
In her book Iraq in Wartime, Dina Khoury discusses the lasting impacts of the Iran-Iraq 
war (1980-88). Khoury asserts that the Iraqi state and society were militarized by this prolonged 
war, and that they remain militarized to this day. She argues that the present situation in Iraq 
must be understood in the context of the Iran-Iraq war, and the subsequent 1991 uprisings against 
the Ba‘th regime, because they had lasting impacts on Iraqi society and gender relations.28 
Khoury shows that, during the ‘80s, the Ba‘th regime began to emphasize the masculine Iraqi 
soldier as its ideal citizen. However, many soldiers participated in the 1991 Uprising which 
followed Operation Desert Storm, so the Ba‘th regime shifted its discourse, constructing a 
version of masculinity based on agricultural work and tribal allegiance.29 In this thesis I will 
show how militarization and tribal masculinities threatened, and took, Iraqi women’s rights and 
lives 
Besides her historical insights into Iraqi women and the state in the 1970s-80s, al-
Jawaheri investigates in depth the years of US sanctions and occupation. Her book, Women in 
Iraq, is a sociological and economic study conducted in the late 90s and early 2000s through 
questionnaires and interviews. In her analysis, Al-Jawaheri argues that UN sanctions had the 
effect of limiting women’s role in society. Without revenue oil sales, the government was unable 
to rebuild civilian infrastructure after Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Iraq’s schools 
deteriorated to the point that many women were encouraged, or forced, to stay home.30 In 
 
28 Dina Khoury, Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013),  
29 Khoury, Iraq in Wartime, 11-12. 
30 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 77. 
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addition, the state’s shrinking role as an employer made it difficult for Iraqi women to find 
socially acceptable and safe jobs. Al-Jawaheri argues that this resulted in many women 
becoming impoverished, and increasingly dependent on the men in their lives.31 I agree with al-
Jawaheri’s conclusions, and I intend to expand on them by offering an account of the ways Iraqi 
women responded to and resisted these devastating social and economic changes.  
 Political scientist Nicola Pratt and anthropologist Nadje al-Ali published What Kind of 
Liberation? in 2009. This study of the US occupation of Iraq utilizes a range of journalistic, 
governmental, and NGO reports, in addition to extensive interviews with Iraqi women. Pratt and 
al-Ali argue that the US government, despite a discourse of “liberation,” made conditions 
significantly worse for Iraqi women.32 They examine the gendered impact of the initial invasion 
in 2003, the ways in which women were politically marginalized as the US attempted to make 
Iraq into a puppet state, and the goals, activities, and challenges faced by Iraqi women activists.33 
I have been inspired by al-Ali and Pratt’s analysis of politics in post-invasion Iraq, and while 
these authors focus mainly on Iraqi women activists, I attempt to broaden their discussion to 
include economic survival and writing as forms of resistance. 
 Fawaz A Gerges, in ISIS: A History, contextualizes ISIL’s emergence, worldview, and 
brutality. He argues that the US and post-2003 Iraqi political elite share blame for ISIL’s 
emergence, and that it’s horrific methods can be traced back to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, founder 
of ISIL’s predecessor, al-Qaeda Iraq.34 I supplement Gerges’ work with gender-specific analyses 
of ISIL from scholars like Nadje al-Ali, who argues that the sexual enslavement of Yezidi 
women in particular has been a part of a genocidal campaign against the Yezidi Kurds, a 
 
31 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 54-5. 
32 Al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind of Liberation?, 2. 
33 Ibid., 20.  
34 Gerges, ISIS, 8-14. 
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religious minority found primarily in Iraq. Al-Ali also makes the important argument that, for 
many women, the violence does not end when they escape ISIL, but may continue via their 
families, foreign journalists, and even doctors.35 I intervene in this historiography through 
discussions of the ways Iraqi women resisted both the violence and ISIL and violence 
perpetrated by foreign media when talking to ISIL survivors.   
Methodology  
This thesis is based on a wide variety of primary sources in an attempt to include the 
voices of as many Iraqi women as possible. I made use of blogs, interviews with refugees and 
women in exile, novels, UN reports, NGO reports, and nonfiction books written by Iraqi women. 
Whether a newspaper was based in the US, or an Arab state like Qatar, I tried to avoid 
journalistic biases by finding articles that quoted Iraqi women at length. To cover issues of US 
imperialism, I used reports from the US Congress, State Department, and Presidential Archives. I 
also analyzed the online magazines and religious rulings of ISIL to construct an argument about 
their worldview.  
Because I am not fluent in Arabic or Kurdish, I mostly depended on English translations 
of Arabic sources. Many of the interviews I read with Iraqi women refugees were conducted via 
a translator, and in chapter one I discuss several Ba‘thist news articles translated by the US 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. In an attempt to leave the voices of Iraqi women in-tact, 
I tried to use novels in which the original author also had a role in writing the translation. While 
this is not an ideal way to write a history of Iraqi women, I attempt to ground my conclusions in 
the secondary literature discussed above.  
Statement of Positionality 
 
35 Nadje al-Ali, “Sexual violence in Iraq: Challenges for transnational feminist politics,” European Journal of 
Women’s Studies 25, no. 1 (2018): 21-2. 
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 The link between myself, my positionality, and the reasons I chose this research topic are 
all essential to understanding my findings. I am a white cishet man from the midwestern United 
States, specifically rural Ohio. I was born in 1997, and while I do not remember the al-Qaeda 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the so-called “War on Terror” was a constant background to my 
childhood. I remember believing that the US military was a force for good at age twelve, which 
leads me to believe that I internalized some of the Islamophobic, racist, and imperialist 
discourses I grew up with. However, I never identified with the conservative politics of the 
George W. Bush administration. Instead, my politics have continued to move leftwards as I have 
grown older. I entered college a liberal, and soon I will graduate a vehement anti-capitalist and 
anti-imperialist transnational feminist. In many ways, this research, which I began in the Spring 
of my Sophomore year of college, has informed my political views, and vice versa.  
My initial research on Iraq led me to believe that the US’s 2003 invasion of Iraq was one 
of the most important factors in the creation of ISIL, and as my interests in gender studies grew, I 
wanted to learn more about the ways Iraqi women resisted US imperialism. As I began to 
develop my theoretical framework through readings books from anthropologist Nadje al-Ali and 
sociologist Zahra Ali, both of whom study Iraqi women, I realized that it is not enough to be 
anti-imperialist. Instead, the approach I adopted from these authors attempts to acknowledge the 
gendered effects of imperialism without erasing local and regional manifestations of patriarchy.36 
This framework shaped the structure of my thesis. 
Chapter Organization 
 This thesis is divided into three chapters, which move chronologically by historical 
period, roughly a decade each. It begins with a chapter on what I call the Sanctions Period, 1990-
 
36 Nadje al-Ali, “Sexual violence in Iraq,” 12-4. 
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2002, followed by another on the US occupation of 2003-2011, and finally a chapter covering 
the most recent period, 2012-2019, during which ISIL was established. Each chapter is divided 
into three main sections, two dealing with the violence of US imperialism and the Iraqi state (or 
ISIL in the third chapter). The third section of each chapter discusses the ways Iraqi women 
resisted the violence against them, whether it was a result of the US, the Iraqi government, or 
ISIL. 
 Chapter one examines the Sanctions Period, arguing that Iraqi women resisted the 
violence of war, sanctions, and a conservative religious campaign by the Ba‘th regime through 
informal economic activities, political mobilizations against the US, and through writing articles, 
poetry, and novels. Chapter two covers the US occupation, and it argues that during these years 
Iraqi women resisted the violence against them through continuing to engage in the informal 
economy, expanding their political activism, and blogging. Chapter three begins with a history of 
ISIL, arguing that US imperialism and the post-2003 Iraqi government created the conditions for 
ISIL to establish itself as a proto-state. It then turns to ISIL’s religious doctrine as it relates to 
women, and finally argues that Iraqi women resisted through new survival methods, adapting 




The Stress of Sanctions 
(1990-2002) 
A middle-aged woman sits on a stool in her home in Baghdad, a few strands of hair 
poking out of her headscarf. A young girl stands next to her, swaying in-and-out of the frame, 
focused intensely on an unseen object. Speaking to a documentary filmmaker, the unnamed 
woman says, “I can’t even afford to buy my daughter a school bag. How can we feed our 
children when the prices are so high?”37 This interview took place in 1992, only two years after 
the UN imposed economic sanctions, and one year after the US-led a coalition strike “Operation 
Desert Storm.” This unnamed woman was not alone in her struggle. Economic warfare in the 
form of sanctions, coupled with the destruction caused by Operation Desert Storm, led to the 
death and impoverishment of many Iraqis. These devastating wars had gender-specific impacts 
on Iraqi women, who faced inter-connected violence on communal, national, and trans-national 
scales.  
Before going further, it is important to establish a brief timeline of events leading up to 
Operation Desert Storm. As a dictator, Saddam Hussein found himself in a particularly 
vulnerable position at the end of the Iran-Iraq in 1988. He was billions of dollars in debt, his 
neighboring Gulf countries were keen to lower oil prices, and there was a standing army of 
restless Iraqi soldiers who could not be demobilized for fear of contributing to unemployment 
and unrest.38 After privatization and austerity measures failed to help his economic situation, 
 
37 Greetings from Iraq, directed by Signe Taylor, (Stanford: Department of Communications of Stanford University, 
1992). 
38 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 241-2; Amatzia Baram, “The 
Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” in The Saddam Hussein Reader, ed. Turi Munthe (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 
2002), 253. 
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Saddam decided to invade Kuwait to seize its plentiful oil reserves. The Iraqi army invaded 
Kuwait on the August 2nd, 1990. The US first responded on August 6th by using its dominant 
position in the UN to pass a Security Council resolution banning all trade with Iraq. In the 
following months, the US built a coalition army that invaded Iraq and Kuwait in January 1991.39 
As will be seen below, these actions by the US, along with Saddam Hussein’s response, had far 
reaching consequences. 
This chapter investigates the years 1990-2002, or what I refer to as the “Sanctions 
Period.” It traces the major events of this period, including Operation Desert Storm, the 
imposition of sanctions, and their economic, social, and political affects. It investigates the 
gender-specific impacts of these events, and the ways in which Iraqi women struggled to survive 
and resist. I begin by looking at the Ba‘th regime and how its “tribo-Islamic” policies, based on 
religious and kin-based power structures, strengthened male control over Iraqi women during 
this period. Next, I turn to US imperialism in Iraq as practiced through sanctions and the 
destruction of Iraq’s civilian infrastructure during Operation Desert Storm. The chapter then 
moves to a close examination of the strategies women used to survive against crushing odds, and 
the ways in which more fortunate women took political action to resist the many forms of 
violence they faced.  
This chapter is somewhat unique in that the Iraqi women who appear in it are less likely 
to be identified based on their sect and ethnicity than the women in the following chapters. 
Sectarianism was not as common or normalized in ‘90s like it has become since the US 
occupation began.40 Most of my sources are from the ‘90s, as opposed to retrospective accounts, 
 
39 Tripp, Iraq, 241-44; Dina Rizk Khoury, Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance, (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 40-44. 
40 Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 62; Zamir al-Haddad (pseudonym), 
interview, August 21, 2019. 
 17 
and as a result they do not reflect today’s sectarian political climate. If the women in this chapter 
had given this information I would have provided it, but they either did not, or in the case of the 
authors I mention, I was unable to find it in my research. In terms of ethnicity, I have decided not 
to include narratives from Iraqi Kurdistan in this chapter. From 1991-2003, Iraqi Kurdistan was a 
de-facto autonomous state, and circumstances there were so different from the rest of Iraq that 
most scholars of Iraqi women’s history include separate chapters to cover the region, even in the 
periods after 2003.41 In the following chapter I attempt to re-incorporate Iraqi Kurdistan into this 
narrative. In this chapter, however, I did not believe it possible to effectively contextualize and 
analyze Iraqi women’s resistance in both Iraqi Kurdistan and Southern Iraq.42  
(1) Patriarchal Policies of the Ba‘th regime 
The strategies used by Saddam Hussein and the Ba’th authoritarian regime to control its 
population were completely rewritten during the Sanctions Period. First, it is important to note 
that Saddam Hussein and his cronies became extremely rich as a result of UN sanctions.43 
Civilians bore the brunt of the poverty, disease, and malnutrition that sanctions brought with 
them. Historian Charles Tripp argues that this contrast between the country’s rulers and its 
masses helped keep Saddam Hussein in power, because it allowed him to create a “Shadow 
State.” Tripp defines this term as a patron-client network that decentralized the government, 
disempowered its institutions, and awarded resources based on loyalty to Saddam Hussein.44  
Another governing strategy that helped keep Saddam Hussein in office was his “faith 
campaign.” Without a strong, centralized state, Saddam Hussein needed the support of Iraq’s 
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tribal and religious leaders. Islamism, or the politicized form of Islam, was already sweeping the 
region, and Saddam Hussein used this to his advantage. While his “neopatriarchal state” of the 
‘70s and ‘80s took power away from tribal and religious forms of patriarchy, his tribo-Islamic 
policies of the ‘90s returned that power. This happened at the direct expense of Iraqi women’s 
rights. For example, in 1990 a law was passed allowing gender-based violence to be committed 
based on perceived moral transgressions, and in 1994 prostitution became punishable by death.45  
Moreover, in the aftermath of Desert Storm and during sanctions, Saddam Hussein’s 
discourse attempted to re-shape Iraqi identity around the victimized Iraqi woman. 46 At a 1992 
ceremony where he awarded several women with medals for their bravery during Operation 
Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein said, “Almighty God wished to expose falsehood on the largest 
scale with the Ibn-Khaldun ship incident. The [Western] aggressors attacked unarmed women 
and their children.”47 This quote is emblematic of the way Saddam Hussein pivoted with regard 
to gender policy. As the state decentralized, Saddam Hussein stopped promoting women’s rights 
like he had in the ‘70s and ‘80s. Instead, he pandered to conservative men who did not value 
women’s rights, and with whom he needed to stay in favor with to ensure their loyalty.48  
In addition, Iraqi women faced multiple barriers to formal employment under sanctions 
due to the state’s inability to maintain a large public sector. The public sector, strong during the 
70s and into the 80s, shrank as the Ba’th regime’s welfare state collapsed and it privatized much 
of the economy.49 This had previously been the most socially acceptable sphere for women to 
work in, and it provided women with exceptional benefits, such as paid maternity leave, on site-
 
45 Ali, Women and Gender in Iraq, 112. For example, the legal age for marriage was 18, but this was no longer 
enforced during the last years of Saddam. 
46 Khoury, Iraq in Wartime, 217. 
47 Baghdad INA, “Saddam Awards Medals, Discusses Women’s Role,” trans. Federal Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS), March 4, 1992. 
48 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 96-8. 
49 Tripp, Iraq, 241-2. 
 19 
day care, and the assurance of a safe work environment. Women who lost their job in the public 
sector found it difficult to find employment in the private sector due to social stigma. For women 
who were able to retain a job in the public sector, they did not have incentive to continue 
working. Wages amounted to a few dollars a month, and the employment benefits available to 
women during the 70s and 80s were gone along with the welfare state. Al-Jawaheri’s research 
shows that while unemployment rose among Iraqi women, they became more dependent on men. 
For women who did work, their desperate need for money made them less likely to speak out 
against unhealthy work environments.50 
(2) The Sole Superpower: US Imperialism and Iraqi women 
Operation Desert Storm was a new height of US imperialism in Iraq. In 1990 the Soviet 
Union was on its last legs. The US was emboldened by the end of the Cold War– for the past 50 
years its foreign policy in the Middle East had been dictated by calculations about the Soviet 
Union’s potential response, but this was no longer the case. Many Arab states, including Iraq, 
had been socialist states and allies of the USSR, but the US could now act as the sole superpower 
in the region. The US’s confidence and nonchalance are present in a July 1990 conversation 
between US ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie and Saddam Hussein. According to a transcription 
from the Iraqi government, Glaspie practically gave Iraq the green light to attack Kuwait when 
she told him “we [the US] have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border 
disagreement with Kuwait… The issue is not associated with America.”51 This turned out to be 
far from the truth, and within a year the US had effectively demonstrated its new global powers 
 
50 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 35-46.  




by carrying out a devastating land and air war, and using its position in the UN to pass the most 
comprehensive set of economic sanctions to date.  
Operation Desert Storm began on January 16th with an aerial bombardment that lasted six 
weeks. During the air war, the US used illegal weapons such as napalm, fuel-air explosives, and 
“superbombs,”52 and it chose not to distinguish between civilian and military personnel. The 
same was true for infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, highways, oil wells and refineries, 
and food storage facilities. Formally, the ground war only lasted 4 days, though US troops 
continued to attack and occupy Iraqi territory for several days thereafter.53 During Operation 
Desert Storm the US violated the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the Nuremberg Charter, and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, among other international laws and treaties.54 The 
US’s disregard for Iraqi lives is made clear by noting its conduct during these months, and it is to 
the gender-specific ways that US foreign policy affected Iraqi women that we now turn.  
US imperialism had devastating impacts on Iraqi women, especially with regards to 
health and healthcare. With the Soviet Union in disarray and nearly dissolved, President George 
H. W. Bush and his administration easily whipped the United Nations Security Council votes 
needed to pass a resolution forbidding all trade with Iraq. While in previous decades the Iraqi 
state generously subsidized healthcare and offered gender-specific services, like reproductive 
education and ante and post-natal services, after 1991 it was unable to so much as repair many of 
the hospitals destroyed by the coalition bombings. Perhaps more urgent was the fact that trade 
prohibitions prevented desperately needed medicine and equipment from entering the country.55  
 
52 According to Ramsey Clark, superbombs weigh about 2.5 tons and are designed to pierce bomb shelters, with the 
intention to kill protected government leaders. Ramsey Clark, “Charge of War Crimes Against US,” in The Saddam 
Hussein Reader, ed. Turi Munthe (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002), 325-6. 
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54 Clark, “Charge of War Crimes,” 315-25. 
55 Ibid., 324.  
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The US’s actions also impacted women’s mental health by indirectly placing an extra 
burden on them as heads of households and housekeepers. This burden was a result of social 
norms wherein women were responsible for domestic care within most of Iraqi society. As their 
living standards decreased and family members became sick with newly untreatable diseases, 
Iraqi women took on an incredible emotional burden that impacted their physical and mental 
health. Research by Yasmin al-Jawaheri shows that, by 2000, more than 9 in 10 Iraq women 
were experiencing health problems like anxiety, headaches, high blood pressure, depression, and 
irregular menstruation.56 The Sanctions Period was a horrific time to be a mother or bare 
children, as over half a million children and infants died from malnutrition between 1991 and 
1995, according to a study done by the UN.57 Infant mortality and malnutrition rates such as 
these had not been seen since the 1950s.58 
 Economic sanctions coupled with US-led airstrikes also decimated the prospects for Iraqi 
women’s education. The Iraqi state had previously been a beacon of education in the region, well 
known for its advanced universities and praised for its illiteracy eradication efforts. This changed 
during sanctions, which hit Iraq’s education department especially hard. Many schools were 
destroyed during Operation Desert Storm, and sanctions prevented up-to-date textbooks or basic 
school supplies from entering the country. The lack of funds to rebuild and repair schools left 
many schools without adequate amounts of drinking water, or hygienic bathrooms. Most families 
were asked to pay public-school fees they could not afford. This, coupled with a lack of 
economic opportunity for women, led many parents to prefer paying for the education of a son 
rather than a daughter, and a drop in women’s enrolment in primary and secondary schools. This 
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outcome had a gender-specific effect Iraqi women, as it is widely accepted that women’s 
education, coupled with their participation in the labor force, tends to improve gender equality.59  
(3) Iraqi Women From Economic Survival to Political Resistance  
In her novel Absent, Iraqi writer Betool Khedairi follows several Iraqi women and the 
different ways in which they cope with the widespread poverty brought on by sanctions. Umm 
Ghayeb, one of the main characters, begins selling homemade clothes after her husband, Abu 
Ghayeb, loses his job as a state employee. However, despite providing her home with a source of 
income, Umm Ghayeb is still expected to do all of the housework. When he arrives home, Umm 
Ghayeb sets out her husband’s slippers and puts away his shoes. She cooks for the family. In 
addition, her sudden status as the family’s provider creates tension between her and Abu Ghayeb, 
who complains, “we’re drowning in a sea of beads, buttons, and thread.” 60 As the narrative 
unfolds, Abu Ghayeb becomes increasingly desperate to start a successful business.  
Khedairi’s novel reflects several realities of sanctions. Selling homemade clothes and 
taking jobs as domestic servants existed before sanctions, but during the ‘90s these economic 
activities became commonplace for many impoverished Iraqi women.61 In addition, the tension 
in Umm Ghayeb’s marriage reflect a pattern noticed by al-Jawaheri, whose sociological study 
found that widespread poverty was accompanied by increased attempts by men to control the 
education, careers, and behaviors of the women in their lives.62 Iraqi women had these and other 
factors working against them during sanctions, and their means of resistance can be, for 
simplicity’s sake, divided into two categories: economic survival and political resistance.   
 
59 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 58-70. 
60 Betool Khedairi, Absent, originally published as Ghayeb in 2004, trans. Muhayman Jamil, (Cairo: American 
University in Cairo Press, 2005), 22. 
61 Z. Ali, Women and Gender in Iraq, 109. 
62 Al-Jawaheri, Women in Iraq, 100-4. 
 23 
Economic Survival 
During the Sanctions Period, many Iraqi women turned to informal economic activities to  
stay alive. One activity that seems to have been used by low-income women in particular is 
domestic work such as cleaning houses.63 Scholars such as Louise Cainkar have argued 
convincingly that domestic work– paid or unpaid– goes unappreciated in most societies because 
of its gendered connotation, and because it takes place out of the view of the public eye. This 
was certainly true in Iraq during the sanctions period. The gendered aspect of domestic work 
provided a form of employment to Iraqi women when their options were otherwise limited, 
though it also left women vulnerable to abuse.64  
 Afrah Jassim, one of over 30 women interviewed as a part of an oral history project led 
by Dr. Laura Hamblin, resisted the violence of US imperialism and the Ba’th regime by fighting 
to stay alive. Most of the interviews were conducted in 2007, in Amman, Jordan, with Iraqi 
women who were there as refugees. Afrah Jassim lived in Baghdad until 1997, when she took 
refuge in Jordan. She hoped to find more economic opportunities abroad, though she found her 
options were mostly limited to cleaning houses. Because of the association of Iraq and poverty 
during the Sanctions Period, many people assumed that she was a sex worker: 
I noticed that even in the office where I work as a cleaner, they tend to send me to 
houses where they have bachelors and men. Even then they were approaching me. 
It was very hard... I work, even though they use my flesh—that’s the expression 
in Arabic. I am being harassed, but I can still work.65 
 
This quote from Afrah shows that being able to work was more important to her than the abusive 
conditions under which she worked. Desperate to work, Afrah put up with these conditions 
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because it was between that and being unable to pay her rent or support her daughter. Although 
she is a displaced Iraqi woman in Amman, Afrah’s story is representative of the conditions many 
Iraqi women had to deal with in Iraq itself, or as refugees in neighboring countries. Her story is 
heartbreaking but ultimately one of survival.  
A coping mechanism used across class-lines was selling non-essential household items. 
The extent to which women partook in this, however, did depend on their class status. Dr. Huda 
al-Jawad, a professor from Baghdad, provides an example of what this looked like among 
middle-class professionals. Reflecting on the Sanctions Period, she says, “[my husband and I] 
started selling most of the things that we thought were luxuries and started living from these 
things… Now when I remember the books I had to sell for that period I cry because these were 
very valuable”.66 Dr. Jawad’s story demonstrates the collapse of what was formerly a thriving 
middle class that included many women. It also shows the emotional sacrifices that she made, 
namely letting go of a piece of herself in the form of her books, which are essential to academic 
life. As much as it hurt to do so, Dr. Al-Jawad was lucky to have valuable books to sell.  
The more impoverished people became, the lower the definition of “luxuries,” became. 
The unnamed woman, interviewed for a 1992 documentary and mentioned above, explains, “we 
had two deep freezers– we sold them. We had a washing machine– we sold it. I had some gold 
jewelry– I sold it, and now we are spending the money to survive.” The goods she lists here are 
not so different from what can be found in a typical middle-class home in America, and one 
might suspect that she made a reasonable profit from this. She specifies that she is using the 
money to “survive,” but what did survival look like in 1992, with more than a decade to go 
before the sanctions were lifted? The unnamed woman explains:  
 
66 Laura Hamblin, “Dr. Huda Al-Jawad Transcript,” Iraqi Women Refugees, interview, trans. Hala al-Sarraf, 
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When we go to the market we can’t afford to buy anything anymore. Everyone is 
getting sick– diabetes and heart disease. I developed diabetes. When I go to the 
hospital there’s no medicine… The government issues booklets so you can buy 
medicine for diabetes. But all I can get are little pills, which don’t help. There are 
no insulin injections at all.67 
 
As this interview suggests, selling off personal items may not have been enough for some Iraqi 
women. It was not clear if this woman was an FHH, a demographic that made up 20% of the 
population after the Operation Desert Storm, but if she was, she would have been far more likely 
to fall into extreme poverty.68 
 Iraqi women living in extreme poverty had to resort to much drastic means of 
overcoming severe economic hardship. As the unnamed woman ran out of things to sell, or was 
unable to find work, it is possible she turned to begging. She would have been in the company of 
many other Iraqi women, observed by researchers weaving through Baghdad traffic in the all-
black abaya, covering everything but their faces, palms extended for help. As she and her child 
reached the point of starvation, she may have sold the door off their house.69 If it did not come to 
this point, it is unclear whether she could have received the necessary medical care to manage 
her diabetes, especially with the hospitals lacking medical supplies under the sanctions.70 This is 
to say that there were limits to these economic survival strategies.  
Writing for Political Resistance 
In 1991, thousands of Iraqis in the urban South took to the streets calling for the end of 
the Ba’th regime. Their prosperity in the ‘70s and ‘80s had been accompanied by brutal 
repression of any opposition, and Saddam Hussein had spent the last ten years dragging the 
country into unnecessary wars for which they paid with their lives. Saddam Hussein showed no 
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mercy to this uprising, openly attacking his own citizens with military-style strikes. His 
ruthlessness made politically organizing one’s community a difficult task, even among men.71 
However, the state was not as strong as it had been in the ‘80s, which left more room for political 
acts of dissent in which women often engaged.72  
 Saddam Hussein and the Ba’th regime allowed women to politically organize against the 
US, but not against the regime itself. For example, a 1990 article published by the state-run 
newspaper Baghdad INA described a group of “glorious Iraqi women” taking actions to condemn  
UN sanctions. The article states that these women wrote a list of grievances which they handed 
the US chargé d’affaires in Baghdad. The letter protested the US’s leadership role in imposing 
the sanctions, saying average Iraqis would suffer from a lack of access to basic necessities like 
food and medicine.73 In fact, the Iraqi women in question may have been put up to the task of 
handing this letter of protest to the US chargé d’affaires by Saddam himself, but this does not 
mean they were passive actors of the regime. Zahra Ali’s ethnographic study shows that many 
women worked for the regime out of convenience in the 1990s but found ways to exercise 
agency within certain constraints.74 The letter written by these women likely reflected their own 
sense of outrage at US actions. 
The Ba’th regime occasionally mobilized women for anti-sanctions demonstrations. This 
gave them a chance to express their anger at US imperialism. One such incident, also described 
in an article from Baghdad INA, took place in 1992 at the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation 
in Baghdad. A large group of women demonstrated in response to actions taken by a UN 
inspection team, led by Americans. Next-day coverage of the demonstration from Baghdad INA 
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suggests these were not spontaneous acts, but organized by Ba’thists within the ministry.75 In an 
interview I conducted with a male professor who spent the ‘90s teaching in Baghdad, he recalled 
political actions taken by women similar to the one described in this article. For a demonstration 
like this, he says, they would have brought home-made signs and placards to leave at the door of 
the ministry, and chanted slogans denouncing American aggression.76 Dina Khoury argues 
obligatory pro-Iraq actions may have been one of the most important factors in keeping the 
regime intact during sanctions. However, it is likely Iraqi women had agency when participating 
in at least some protests like this one, as the events Khoury refers to were more likely to be 
celebrations of Saddam Hussein’s birthday, for example.77 
Because of the limitations imposed by the state on women’s ability to organize 
politically, some educated women resorted to writing as their main, and sometimes only, tool of 
resistance. Hadia Hussein is a writer who was employed by state-run newspapers in Baghdad for 
most of the ‘90s. Women like Hadia, who had the privilege of stable employment and an 
elevated voice during sanctions, had the option to resist the Ba’th regime and its tribo-Islamic 
policies through their reporting. However, in doing so they were risking their jobs, freedoms, and 
lives. To successfully critique the regime in its newspapers required subtlety and nuance. Hadia 
and her colleagues cloaked their dissent by diluting their language, referring to legends, and 
praying their articles made it past the censors.78 In recalling a coworker who was caught by the 
regime, Hadia says, “he was taken from his house, and he was never seen after that”.79 It is 
impossible to know what happened to this man for sure, but given Saddam Hussein’s willingness 
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to have members of his immediate family assassinated, and his use of chemical weapons against 
his own population,80 it seems likely that Hadia’s friend was subject to arbitrary execution. 
Despite the risks, Hadia resisted the Ba‘th regime through journalism.  
In the midst of the violence of sanctions and the Ba‘th regime, Hadia, along with many 
other Iraqi women, found refuge in poetry. Hadia was writing poetry even in the 70’s, when Iraq 
was prospering and providing women with the best education the region had to offer.81 But as 
her country was dragged into one war after another, and as the regime became more openly 
repressive, poetry took on a more important role in her life. “I think it was the number of wars 
we’ve been through,” she says, “poetry [took] me to an imaginary place that didn’t exist at that 
time.”82 For Hadia, poetry provided an escape from the suffering of war. It is widely accepted 
among feminist scholars that poetry is a form of resistance. In her seminal essay, “Poetry is not a 
Luxury,” Audre Lorde argues that, for women, and perhaps black and brown women especially, 
poetry is a necessity. It puts women in touch with a hidden source of their power that can 
become “spawning grounds for the most radical and daring of ideas.”83 This seems true for 
Hadia, who eventually left Iraq so that she could write more openly about her experiences. 
As she developed as a writer, Hadia felt called to turn towards a different and less 
accessible medium to express herself: the novel. This was a gradual shift which Hadia felt was 
necessary if she was to process the loss that accompanies war. 
At that time, because of the wars, stories served me better than poetry. So I started 
writing stories. But after a while I realized that because of my experience at work 
[as a journalist], because of what I see at work, because I’ve accumulated so many 
stories in my head, that I needed to let [them] out through a different means which 
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is more detailed. So I started writing novels because novels give you all the 
detail—the nitty gritty details of the situation.84 
 
Hadia’s novels were an extension of what her poetry had done for her. They took her 
away from reality and into a world where she had some control, a space where it was easier to 
confront loss. By 1999, she realized she would never be able to publish her books as she wanted 
to under the Ba’th regime, so she moved to Jordan. Her novels quickly earned her a spot on a list 
of authors blacklisted by the regime, making it impossible for her to return home or contact her 
family in Iraq.85 
Another Iraqi author is Betool Khedairi, who grew up in Baghdad with a Scottish mother 
and Iraqi father. She spent much of the Sanctions Period travelling between the UK, Jordan, and 
Iraq, giving her a perspective on sanctions unavailable to most.86 Her novel, Absent, mentioned 
above, was published just after the Sanctions Period ended. Khedairi’s work served the dual 
purpose of self-expression and elevating of Iraqi women’s stories. Much like Hadia, Khedairi has 
noted the healing role that her creativity plays in her life, saying in an interview, “I write for 
myself… I can’t imagine myself in another career.”87 In addition to giving her a sense of 
purpose, Khedairi’s novels have made an impact on audiences all over the world. Her first novel, 
A Sky So Close, has been translated into three languages, and her second novel, Absent, is 
available in both Arabic and English.88  
Khedairi uses several techniques to raise awareness of the impacts that UN sanctions and 
Operation Desert Storm had on Iraqi women and men during the Sanctions Period. At the 
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beginning of several chapters in Absent, Khedairi include quotes that provide the reader with 
more insight into the real-life devastation caused by the US-led coalition and sanctions. For 
example, chapter three starts with the following, “[in 1991] some 88,000 tons of bombs were 
dropped on Iraq, an explosive tonnage judged equivalent to seven Hiroshima-sized atomic 
bombs.”89 The emotional connection offered by the novel format, and the shock-factor of 
statistics such as this complement each other well, and Khedairi uses them to offer a critique of 
the US.  
Khedairi also draws attention to the gender-specific impacts that the US and Ba’th 
regime’s actions had on Iraqi women. Dalal, the protagonist, has a friend, Ilham, who works in a 
hospital. Ilham’s mood is frequently affected by the number of sick and dying children that she 
attempts to treat on a daily basis. Ilham confides in Dalal, saying,  
I wish I could escape from the hospital, to get away from the image of little ones when 
they die… The children in the South play with leftover shrapnel from the bombing. 
They’re the victims of depleted uranium from the air raids over the areas extending from 
Basra to Karbala, and as far as Baghdad.90 
 
As Ilham shares this with Dalal, she gives the reader insight into the hard realities on the ground 
in Iraq during this period. Ilham’s character also demonstrates the way Iraqi women ultimately 
picked up much of the emotional burden during the Sanctions Period. This phenomenon is 
documented with imperial evidence by sociologist Yasmin al-Jawaheri, who found that sanctions 
caused significant psychological harm to Iraqi women, regardless of their age or class.91 By 
dramatizing these realities, Khedairi elevates the struggle of Iraqi women, resisting the violence 
of the US and Ba’th regime by drawing attention to its gendered nature.  
Conclusion 
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 Throughout the Sanctions Period, Iraqi women resisted the gender-specific impacts of US 
imperialism and the harmful policies of the Ba’th regime through their survival tactics and 
political resistance. While their ability to organize and protest under a one-party state was 
limited, Iraqi women did so, and were politically active through their writing as well. In post-
2003 Iraq, new technology and regime change made it possible for both of these resistance 
methods to be developed further. While the US occupation marked the end of the UN sanctions, 
Iraq’s economy continued to collapse. As a result, many of the economic survival tactics from 
the Sanctions Period would continue and some would move beyond Iraq’s borders.  
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Chapter 2:  
A Gendered Occupation 
(2003-2011) 
I am female and Muslim. Before the occupation, I more or less dressed the way I 
wanted to. I lived in jeans and cotton pants and comfortable shirts. Now, I don’t 
dare leave the house in pants. A long skirt and loose shirt (preferably with long 
sleeves) has become necessary. A girl wearing jeans risks being attacked, 
abducted, or insulted by fundamentalists who have been… liberated! 
-Riverbend, August 23, 200392 
 
 A Baghdadi woman under the pseudonym “Riverbend” began blogging her experience of 
the US occupation in August 2003. Before the occupation, Riverbend worked as a computer 
scientist. Being in her early 30s, she had received much of her education before the UN embargo, 
and likely remembered life before the Iran-Iraq war militarized Iraqi society. Her blog posts 
ranged in subject from her daily life, to her memories of the invasion, to her thoughts on the way 
the media was covering the war in Iraq. Riverbend’s wonderful writing style was quickly 
recognized, and her blog has been published as a series of books. Her blog is closed now, and the 
last of the posts in her books is from 2006. But in the wake of the Iraqi uprisings in October 2019 
I reached out to Riverbend through email to inquire about her views about the corrupt, 
fragmented state that the US left  behind. She told me, “I’m doing especially well with 
everything happening back home– there’s an actual revolution [happening]”.93  
 The US launched “Operation Iraqi Freedom” on March 19, 2003. By April 9, Saddam 
Hussein’s security forces had been overwhelmed by and fallen to the US-led coalition.94 The US 
quickly established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which oversaw the dissolution of 
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the Ba’th party and the Iraqi military, putting about 30,000 experienced administrators and 
300,000 armed men out of work in one fell swoop.95 In 2003 and 2004 the US oversaw the 
implementation of economic reforms which benefitted foreign profiteers more than the average 
Iraqi citizen. It also failed to rebuild the infrastructure it destroyed during the invasion, leaving 
many Iraqis without access to hospitals or running water.96 The 2004 Abu-Ghraib torture scandal 
demonstrated that the US had adopted many of the same terror tactics formerly used by Saddam 
Hussein.97 As the new Iraqi government took shape, insurgencies grew from all sides, and 
sectarian violence exploded into a civil war in 2006.98 In the last years of the occupation, 2008-
2011, as President Barack Obama and his administration began preparing for withdrawal, the US 
supported an increasingly authoritarian Iraqi Prime Minister by the name of Nuri al-Maliki.99 
 As Riverbend’s commentary shows, the US invasion and Occupation of Iraq was a 
gendered affair. It began, in many ways, on September 11, 2001. Political theorist Roxanne L. 
Euben has argued the “violation of human dignity” often results in the mobilization of 
masculinities.100 After experiencing the first modern attack on its own soil on 9/11, the US 
sought to re-assert its dominance, or masculinity, to the world through the so-called “War on 
Terror.” Historian Christine de Matos and law professor Rowena Ward have argued that 
occupations are masculine affairs by nature, with complex webs of hierarchical and gendered 
relationships among “occupiers” and “occupied.” Gendered power relations are present in every 
action and play out on a daily basis. Occupied women are usually said to be “liberated” but face 
harm from occupying forces. Likewise, they argue that the violence of occupation “emasculates” 
 
95 Tripp, Iraq, 282. 
96 Michael Schwartz, War Without End: The Iraq War in Context, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008), 33-35, 43-45. 
97 Tripp, Iraq, 289-92. 
98 Ibid., 306-9. 
99 Fawaz Gerges, ISIS: A History, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016), 106-15. 
100 Roxanne L Euben, “Humiliation and the Political Mobilization of Masculinity,” in Political Theory 43, no. 4, 
(August 2015): 500-4. 
 34 
occupied men, who reassert their masculinity through violence towards and control over 
women.101  
 In this chapter I investigate the military occupation and subsequent economic and 
political control of the Iraqi state by a US-led coalition, which began in early 2003 and lasted 
until the end of 2011. My goal is to demonstrate ways in which Iraqi women resisted threats to 
their legal rights and personal safety during this period. This chapter begins by investigating the 
gender-specific impacts of the occupation’s choices militarily, economically, and politically. I 
also consider the new governing institutions which formed in the wake of the occupation, and the 
effect that their formation and policies had on Iraqi women. Finally, I turn to the actions of Iraqi 
women themselves, looking first into the ways they survived through their economic activity. 
The last section is about women’s political resistance, and, more specifically the way they used 
writing to resist the violence of imperialism and patriarchy. 
(1) Gendering US Foreign Policy: Shock, Awe, and Decentralization  
The same year the US decided to occupy Iraq, Charlotte M. Ponticelli started working for 
the US Department of State as the Senior Coordinator for International Women’s Issues. In a 
speech she delivered about a week after US troops landed in Iraq, titled “Respect for Women,” 
she said that President Bush’s policy in Iraqi aimed at “ensuring women’s rights” which in turn 
“strengthens democracy, bolsters prosperity, enhances stability, encourages tolerance and builds 
a more peaceful and stable world.”102 However, the US occupation of Iraq failed to guarantee 
women’s legal rights, or create a strong democracy, nor did it provide them with peace and 
 
101 Christine de Matos and Rowena Ward, “Analyzing Gendered Occupation Power,” in Gender, Power, and 
Military Occupations: Asia Pacific and the Middle East Since 1945, ed. Christine de Matos and Rowena Ward (New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 1-7. 
102 Charlotte M. Ponticelli, “Respect for Women: The Bush Administrations Firm Commitment,” US Department of 
State Archive, https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/wi/19423.htm.  
 35 
prosperity. From the very beginning, the US’s actions suggest it had little understanding of, or 
care for, the gendered impacts of its occupation. 
The US adopted the “shock-and-awe” doctrine in the lead-up to its invasion of Iraq, 
which was intended to traumatize Iraqi citizens. Naomi Klein documents this twofold strategy in 
her aptly titled book The Shock Doctrine. The first step was to subject the entire Iraqi population 
to a literal terror campaign– an ironic aspect of the so-called “War on Terror”– through sensory 
deprivation and sensory overload. Sensory deprivation took place through destroying 
communication infrastructure and forcing power-outages. Sensory overload took the form of a 
bombing campaign that demonstrated the US’s military might. These tactics were used in an 
attempt to traumatize the Iraqi population because the US believed that doing so would make 
them less resistant to the dramatic social and economic changes that would follow the 
invasion.103  
The second step of shock-and-awe began in mid-2003 after the US overthrew the Ba‘th 
regime and formed a temporary governing body, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).  
This step was called “economic shock therapy,” and it involved passing a series of laws which 
sold off all public industry, weakened unions, and opened Iraq to the global economy.104 The 
only industry that remained nationalized was oil, but all of its profits were controlled by the CPA 
regardless.105 These policies generated wealth for US businesses, but worsened poverty and 
unemployment levels in Iraq. For example, coalition forces destroyed civilian infrastructure 
during the invasion to clear the way for foreign investment in reconstruction.106 From 2003-2006 
74% of construction contracts went to US-based companies, and only 2% to Iraqi companies. 
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This resulted in a labor force made up of foreigners with little at stake in the outcome of their 
reconstruction projects. They were paid regardless of whether or not they successfully rebuilt 
Iraqi hospitals, power plants, and water treatment plants. More often than not, they were 
unsuccessful, and Iraqi were left without healthcare, electricity, and clean water.107 
The CPA’s economic policies had a particularly harsh effect on Iraqi women. In June 
2003 the unemployment rate was around 50-60% for women, and in 2007 it remained between 
25-40%. Regardless, women made up the majority of  unemployed Iraqi workers. By gutting the 
public sector, typically a socially acceptable place for Iraqi women to work, the CPA limited the 
options of Iraqi women even more than during the sanctions period.108 As will be seen below, the 
CPA also strengthened patriarchal forces in Iraq, which left women more dependent on male 
relatives. An economic assessment of women’s employment in Iraq, conducted by the United 
Nations Development Programme, points to lack of permission and freedom of movement as one 
of the main hinderances to women’s employment outside the home.109 
The invasion and CPA policies also created an environment of lawlessness that left Iraqi 
women vulnerable to gender-based violence, sexual assault, and kidnappings. Over two decades 
of wars and sanctions atomized Iraq society and weakened its social fabric.110 After the invasion, 
the relatively small size of the coalition forces rendered them unable to provide the country with 
security. In addition, the CPA’s decision to dissolve the Ba‘th military in 2003 left around three 
hundred thousand armed men unemployed and enraged.111 It is in this context that the Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) published report titled “Climate of Fear: Sexual Violence and Abduction 
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of Women and Girls in Baghdad.” This report details the gendered impact of the security crisis in 
July 2003. Sexual violence and kidnappings were so common that many women and girls were 
not comfortable leaving the house, be it for work, school, or to seek medical assistance. HRW 
states that the problem was largely due to the failure of the US-led coalition to provide necessary 
protections or take Iraqi women seriously.112  
The CPA’s policies also put women’s rights in the hands of conservative tribal and 
religious leaders. These policies were borrowed from Iraq’s history as a British “Mandate” from 
the years 1920-32. Historian Noga Efrati, in her book Women in Iraq, argues that the British 
legally rendered Iraqi women second-class citizens by letting matters of women’s rights be 
decided by tribal law.113 Iraqi women’s rights activists such as Songul Chapuk have argued that 
tribal law sees women as possessions, not fully fledged human beings, and British colonialism 
cemented these views as legal code.114 After the British-installed monarchy was overthrown in 
1958, considerable progress was made to create a unifying legal code that protected women’s 
rights. As discussed in Chapter One, Saddam Hussein began the process of repealing or ignoring 
these laws, though the US-led CPA was influenced more by the British than Saddam Hussein. In 
2003-2005 the CPA delegated power to tribal and religious leaders who took control of local 
security, and it allowed tribal courts to convene and make rulings regarding the women in their 
communities.115  
While the CPA and the US-led coalition army were implementing violent economic 
policies, failing to provide Iraqis with security, and empowering patriarchal leaders, a new Iraqi 
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political elite was taking shape. It was primarily made up of formerly exiled Iraqi men who were 
in favor with the US.116 The formation of the new Iraqi government created a de-facto 
ethnosectarian quota system and politically marginalized Iraqi women. It is to this process and its 
ramifications to which I will now turn. 
 (2) Forming A More Patriarchal Union: The New Iraqi Elite 
Despite US rhetoric about “liberation,” women were never intended to play a major role 
in the new Iraqi government. There were a few exiled Iraqis who helped American officials plan 
for after the invasion, but they were all men. Nadje al-Ali and Nicola Pratt note that the 
formation of a government is a critical time for women to be integrated into the governing 
process, though they were not represented well in the first months or even years.117 The Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC), formed in July 2003, was a largely cosmetic institution, as the CPA 
continued to exercise the most control over Iraqi politics. The IGC included only three women, 
and its formation institutionalized ethnosectarian quotas, meaning it included Shi‘i Arabs, Sunni 
Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Christians proportional to their percent of the Iraqi population.118 A 
select group from the IGC, not including any women, passed the Transitional Authority Law in 
March 2004. This bill set a timeline for electing a transitional parliament, drafting a constitution, 
and holding a public referendum on the constitution, all before 2006.119 
The January 2005 parliamentary elections were undemocratic, exacerbated sectarian 
tensions, and set the country on track for civil war. Sunni Arabs, outraged over being targeted by 
US military operations and their general exclusion from the new government, boycotted this 
election. It was also characterized by threats and intimidation from Islamist (and therefore 
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sectarian) militias at the polls.120 Despite this, the elections went on as planned, and a transitional 
parliament was formed that barely functioned beyond the committee that drafted the new 
constitution.121 A significant achievement among Iraqi women activists was a stipulation that 
every third candidate on a political party’s list had to be a woman. This ensured significant 
inclusion of women in the transitional parliament, but it did not ensure that women’s issues were 
addressed.122 In fact, several scholars of Iraqi women’s history have found that between 2005 
and 2010 many women representatives were chosen by their party because they were not 
politically informed. They were only included in the parliament to fulfil the women’s quota and 
vote with their respective party.123  
The drafting of the constitution was marked by many of the problems as the 2005 
elections, and similarly brought about women’s marginalization, this time in the drafting process. 
There were no Sunni Arabs on the drafting committee until very late in the process, adding to 
sectarian tensions and Sunni fears of political exclusion.124 The committee was made up almost 
entirely of Shi’i Arab and Kurdish representatives, of whom only about 20% were women, some 
of whom were conservative Islamists who supported the tribalization of women’s rights.125 As 
the constitution was being written, laws protecting women’s rights were often discarded in favor 
of federalist policies. These policies, rather than creating a unified law, left issues of women’s 
rights vague and contributed to the increasing communal divides in Iraq.126 The time between the 
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publication of the constitution and its referendum gave little time for public input, especially 
from women’s organizations who were lobbying to ensure that women’s rights were protected.127 
The 2005 Constitution stripped Iraqi women of their rights through its emphasis on 
federalism and so-called “religious freedom,” both of which were the results of institutionalized 
ethno-sectarianism. Article 1 of the constitution states that Iraq is a federal state. This creates 
problem for women’s rights because it allows for different Iraqi regions to have their own laws 
in regard to women’s personal status.128 Without a unifying personal status code promulgated by 
a centralized government, women in more conservative areas of the country were left without 
protection from patriarchal violence. Moreover, Article 41 explicitly gave the responsibility of 
deciding women’s personal status laws to the local level. Anthropologist Nadje Al-Ali and 
political scientist Nicola Pratt argue that this had the effect of “legalizing discriminatory 
practices with regard to marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance.”129 The new Iraqi 
political elite showed more concern with cementing its power than ensuring its citizens, 
especially women, were adequately protected by law.  
As the US and new Iraqi political elite encouraged ethnosectarian politics, the security 
situation in Iraq was becoming worse by the day, resulting in a civil war.130 In February 2006 the 
al-Askariyyah shrine, one of the most important Shi’a monuments in Iraq, was bombed in the 
Sunni-majority town of Samarra, creating a cycle of vicious sectarian violence and retaliation.131  
This sectarian civil war, which lasted until the end of 2007, was not the inevitable outcome of 
Iraq’s religious and ethnic makeup. It was motivated by class and political divisions.132 For 
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example, as the occupation dragged on and Iraq’s economy continued to collapse, thousands of 
young men sat at home, unable to find a job. For these men, joining the local sectarian militia 
would have provided them with a source of income or a way to express their rage towards the 
occupying forces. 133  These militias carried out much of the violence of the Civil War. Baghdad 
became a warzone, and sectarian violence reorganized the city’s population.134 
 
Figure 3: Segregation over time in Baghdad. Acquired through BBC News.135 
The sectarian Civil War left women particularly vulnerable. Due to widespread violence, 
many women were unable to access hospitals, and maternal mortality rates rose (a trend that 
began under UN sanctions in the 1990s).136 By the Civil War of 2006 Iraq could be reasonably 
described as a failed state because it had very little ability to provide its citizens with security or 
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basic needs like running water, electricity, or employment.137 Warring militias appeared in its 
place, many of which had strict Islamist rules that they imposed on all women, and those who 
did not comply were threatened and sometimes murdered.138 According to Zahra Ali’s 
ethnographic study, a common refrain heard among Iraqi women became “before we had one 
Saddam; today we have a Saddam at every street corner.”139 Because of the failing state, Iraqi 
women often had no one to turn to amidst this widespread violence.140 This was not the case, 
however, for Iraqi women in the North. 
Iraqi Kurdistan experienced the occupation in a different way as a result of its autonomy 
from Saddam Hussein during the sanctions period. Iraqi Kurdistan became a de-facto 
autonomous territory in 1991 after mass uprisings opposing the Ba’th regime, and the 
establishment of “no-fly zones” preventing Saddam’s army from reasserting control. This meant 
that, by 2003, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had already been functioning 
independent of the Ba’th regime for over a decade.141 As a result, the infrastructure in Iraqi 
Kurdistan was not destroyed during the invasion, nor did it face the same power-vacuum or 
explosion of violence which challenged southern Iraq during the occupation.142  
Despite their more stable environment, during the occupation women in Iraqi Kurdistan 
faced gender-specific challenges, many of which were on the institutional level. On the one 
hand, women’s civil society was well established by 2003, and, unlike in the South, Kurdish 
women activists did not have to battle the social conservatism enabled by Saddam Hussein’s 
tribo-Islamic policies of the 1990s.143 On the other hand, Kurdish women still dealt with 
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institutional and patriarchal violence enabled by the KRG. The political establishment in the 
KRG was supported by a large conservative base, and therefore it failed to offer women 
protections against gender-based violence committed in response to suspected moral 
transgressions like adultery. Unfortunately for women, the leaders of the KRG cemented their 
power through the cabinet positions and authority won in the new Iraqi government.144 
During the US occupation, women from the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan to the 
southernmost port of Basra were affected by imperial, institutional, and patriarchal violence. 
Whether it was “shock therapy” economics, the repeal of women’s legal protections, or men 
empowered by the failing state, it is safe to say that no Iraqi woman was left unaffected. 
However, Iraqi women did not passively accept this violence. They found ways to survive and 
resist. It is to their voices that I now turn. 
 (3) Iraqi Women’s Resistance: Adaptations and Developments 
 “‘Please dress appropriately next time you come here.’ The man said to me. I looked 
down at what I was wearing–black pants, a beige high necked sweater and a knee length black 
coat. Huh?” This quote from Riverbend’s blog demonstrates the subversive power Iraqi women 
had at their disposal every time they left the house. However, it also demonstrates the 
increasingly patriarchal and controlling environments that Iraqi women found themselves in 
during the occupation. As Riverbend notes when recalling this interaction, her dress did not 
affect only herself, but also the male relative she had to travel with to appear in public. If the 
situation escalated, “there might be an exchange of ugly words or a fight and probably, after that, 
a detention in Abu Ghraib.”145  
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 Feminist scholarship on conflict in the Middle East argues for the inclusion of everyday 
acts such as dress when discussing women’s resistance. Maria Holt and Haifa Jawad, in Women, 
Islam, and Resistance in the Arab World, discuss women’s resistance in times of social upheaval. 
They stress that it is important to take into account forms of resistance that occur as a part of 
women’s everyday lives, because, amidst great conflict and social restriction, resistance on a 
larger scale is often unavailable to women in the Middle East.146 On the other hand, the fall of 
the Ba‘th regime, a one-party state, created new possibilities for women’s political mobilizations.  
Sociologist Zahra Ali argues that, since 2003, Iraqi women have acted out resistance in more 
overt ways by fighting to retain their legal rights, the right to security, and the right to live a 
dignified life.147 I build on these points below, beginning with survival and resistance as a part of 
women’s everyday lives.  
Economic Survival 
A range of factors led hundreds of thousands of Iraqis to leave the country during the 
Occupation, and for many Iraqi women it was a matter of life-and-death. In the face of violent 
economic policies by the coalition, this became an act of resistance. As discussed above, 
occupation ushered in even worse economic conditions than were seen during the UN embargo. 
The barriers to employment for women were often too great to overcome. With the Iraqi state 
decentralized, courtesy of the US, social control by male relatives kept many women from 
working outside the home.148 Even if they were allowed to work, there was little chance of 
finding stable employment, as the coalitions economic policies decimated Iraq’s economy, and 
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its efforts to rebuild the industry it destroyed during the invasion were dismal. Violence from 
militias also caused many Iraqi women to flee the country, especially during the civil war of 
2006-2007. Fleeing car bombs, death threats, and poverty, many Iraqi women made their way to 
Jordan, where the increasing number of refugees made it increasingly difficult to obtain legal 
status as such.149 Without the proper documentation, many women had to find employment in the 
informal economy. 
Many women in Jordan survived through selling goods on the “black market.” A 2007 
report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs says the amount of 
black market activity by Iraqis, who willing to accept low pay and bad working conditions, was 
making it difficult for Jordanians to find employment.150 Soha Hasan is an Iraqi widow who says 
she came to Jordan to find work because her family in Iraq couldn’t find any. She spends her 
days working as a street vendor, something that would be incredibly dangerous in Iraq because 
of the security situation. On her work, Soha says, “the cigarettes we deal with are smuggle[d], so 
they are tax-free, so [customs] can take [or confiscate] them. And this is how life goes on.”151 
Soha fled the violent economic conditions in Iraq, refusing to bow to a globalized economic 
system that was meant to keep her impoverished. In Jordan, despite lacking refugee status, she 
found a way to make a profit through the black market.  
For the women who stayed in Iraq, surviving meant being practical about where you 
earned money. Ansom A., interviewed as a part of the Iraqi Women Refugees oral history 
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project, was left in an incredibly vulnerable position after her entire family was killed during the 
siege of Baghdad in 2003. Soon thereafter, Ansom was forcibly evicted by her landlord. In the 
middle of the night she collected her things and climbed into a cab:  
the taxi driver was driving me around, and I was thinking I wanted to go home, at 
time. And it was scary and we have curfew, and you have to make sure you are 
not going somewhere that you get shot… I was looking for, for nothing—I don’t 
know where to go. And I was passing from the hotel in Baghdad, and they put 
signs in the door saying they need someone who can speak English.152 
 
Ansom had no other options, so she went inside and quickly had a job as an interpreter for the 
US military.153   
Despite entering this line of work through circumstances outside of her control, and 
pressures to act passively within the job, Ansom was able to make her work meaningful. She 
spent four years in and around Fallujah– the site of two major military operations by the US– in 
which she was able to do work translating with a women’s organization (in the context of her 
employment by the US military).  
I used to work in a program, which is IWE (Iraqi Women Engagement). And we 
used to go out and help women with their issues, health issues and, you know; we 
educate them… I think we did a good job with the women. I think so. Because, 
now Fallujah is very, it’s a good place. And women, they are ok.154 
 
Ansom’s view on what happened in Fallujah seems to have been shaped by her association with 
the coalition forces, as about a quarter of the city was destroyed, and it was readily described as 
“unlivable” after the second battle in 2004.155 However, Ansom’s ability to find meaningful 
work assisting less fortunate Iraqi women in the context of her employment as an interpreter 
during the occupation shows the complexity of economic resistance during the occupation. 
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While the occupation shaped the means of resistance available to Iraqi women, many found ways 
to express agency through their work or simply by staying alive. Women in more privileged 
positions were able to go further, committing themselves to   
Political Resistance 
 The lives of Iraqi women underwent dramatic changes as a result of the US occupation, 
as did their political resistance. No longer living under a one-party state, Iraqi women began 
engaging in civil society. The Iraqi women’s rights movement, which had been limited to 
operating as a part of the Ba‘th regime since 1968, began to flourish once again.156 In addition, 
the internet provided new outlets with which Iraqi women could elevate their stories. In the next 
few pages I examine a Kurdish Women’s NGO which formed after the occupation, then I turn to 
the individual story of an Arab Iraqi women’s rights activist, and finally I discuss Riverbend’s 
blog and its conversation with imperialist rhetoric and patriarchal laws. Through these examples 
I hope to demonstrate that Iraqi women’s resistance often looked beyond ethnic and sectarian 
divisions.  
The programming by Women’s NGOs varied widely during the Occupation, and some 
were more politicized than others, but many rose above ethnosectarian tensions to deliver relief 
to struggling Iraqi women. Asuda, a women’s NGO based in Iraqi Kurdistan, is an illustrative 
example of this. The mission of Asuda was and remains to reduce gender-based violence 
throughout all of Iraq, and it does so through offering shelter, legal aid, and literacy and sewing 
classes to women at risk.157 We can get a glimpse of the type of shelters run by organizations like 
Asuda through the eyes of white American journalist Mark Lattimer, who wrote a piece on it for 
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The Guardian in 2007, the height of the Sectarian War. Despite his inherent biases, his article 
provides a useful account of these shelters in the absence of descriptions by Iraqi women 
themselves. Lattimer recalls entering a small unmarked building and making his way to the attic 
through a secret staircase disguised as a broom closet. The windows were high, and mattresses 
were piled in the corner, where they would remain until nightfall. The space was big enough to 
house around 20 women, who escaped abusive marriages and militia violence as close as a 
nearby town and as far away as Iraq’s southernmost port of Basra.158  
The women who run these shelters are in near as much danger as the women who reside 
in them. Solaf, who spoke with Lattimer under a pseudonym, tells Lattimer that she is used to 
receiving threats because of her work. She is tasked with negotiating with the families of the 
women who take refuge at Asuda’s shelter, and she tries to reach agreements so that women can 
return safely home. 159 However, if a case cannot be resolved through negotiations, it goes to 
Khanim Latif, Asuda’s director, and a team of lawyers who work with Asuda to take legal 
action. Despite working in a corrupt system, Latif has gone on record saying that Asuda is 
usually successful in resolving the domestic problems of women who end up in their care.  
Asuda seems to have resisted any attempts to change their agenda by foreign donors. 
Much of Asuda’s funding seems to come from the UN and charitable organizations based in 
Europe. This was true as of 2017, which is the oldest financial data I can find from Asuda.160 If 
the same was true in 2007, it may explain Mark Lattimer’s interest in the organization. It would 
also be to the credit of Asuda for sticking to their purpose of providing direct relief. The 
scholarship on Iraqi women’s NGOs suggests that this was not an easy task, as many NGOs had 
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their agenda shaped by international donors who wanted them to provide “democracy training” 
rather than direct assistance to Iraqi women in need.161  
Iraqi women had to resist local patriarchal forces and random violence which 
characterized the occupation at the same time as they resisted the corruption and institutional 
violence of the new Iraq state. Inthessar, an Iraqi woman activist based in the Southern city of 
Basra, provides an example of how Iraqi women did just that. She told her story during an 
interview conducted and translated by the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP); a 
governmental organization founded in 2007 by the Catalan regional government of Spain. In her 
work during the years following the invasion she organized around ending domestic violence. 
She recalls organizing to change articles of the new constitution that would weaken women’s 
legal rights and traveling to attend workshops with international organizations like Amnesty 
International the UN. This caught the attention of a local militia: 
[I] started to receive threats because of my work with these organizations, and it 
became abnormal, like receiving threats by SMS. They said, “don’t go out and 
work,” or “don’t talk about this subject, leave the work, there is no work, no 
travelling, no courses [allowed].” I never answered and kept working and one day 
they bombed our house. After that they kept threatening but we never left the 
house. The government did nothing, no police, no security. I stayed home for 20 
days but I have internet and organizations came to the house… So I started to 
work from home and everybody thought I left, but I was working at home and 
never stopped organizing… after that [20 days was over] I went out again.162 
 
The ethnographic research done by Zahra Ali indicates that Inthessar’s story is not uncommon. 
While some women activists were forced to leave the country, many made strategic changes to 
 
161 Al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind of Liberation?, 146-7; Z. Ali, Women and Gender in Iraq, 172-3, 190. 
162 “6.-Women in Najaf,” YouTube, February 18, 2010, originally published February 15, 2010 by ICIP, 
https://youtu.be/SWxBWNKl-dI.  
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their behavior which allowed them to continue working, such as moving to an area where they 
would not be attacked because of their religious sect.163  
Iraqi women also took political action through the internet. The new technology of the 
2000s made reaching a large audience through one’s writing possible without a book deal. Some 
economically privileged Iraqi women used the growing popularity of blogs to call attention to the 
gendered impacts of the occupation. I will use Riverbend, a woman from Baghdad who began 
blogging just after the invasion, as a case study for this. The existence of Riverbend’s blog 
suggests she is from a middle-class background because it means she had frequent access to a 
computer and the internet. She also posts about losing her job in software development after the 
occupation began,164 again suggesting a middle-class background simply by virtue of the fact 
that she had a job before 2003. Riverbend never specifies her ethnicity, which leads me to 
believe that she is Arab because this is the largest ethnic group in Baghdad. As for her target 
audience, her use of English and posts such as “American Elections 2004,” in which Riverbend 
pleads with US voters not to re-elect George W. Bush, lead me to believe that she was writing to 
politically informed US citizens.165 
Riverbend resisted the occupation through pointing out the corruption of the Occupying 
forces and the new government they were installing. In a post from September 2003, she 
discusses the ways in which Iraq’s resources and industry were being looted by Americans, the 
formerly exiled Iraqis placed in power by the US-led coalition (who she refers to as “puppets,”) 
and foreign investors more generally. Riverbend goes as far as to say that the entire country is 
“for sale” on the condition that the buyer is an American or British corporation. She continues: 
 
163 Zahra Ali, “Women’s political activism in Iraq: Caught between NGOization and the struggle for a civil state,” in 
International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 12, no. 1, (2018): 39.  
164 Riverbend, “Will Work For Food…” in Baghdad Burning, 21-25.  
165 Riverbend, “American Elections 2004,” in Baghdad Burning II, 10-13.  
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To hear of the first of the economic reforms announced by Kamil Al-Gaylani, the 
new Iraqi Finance Minister, you’d think Iraq was a Utopia and the economy was 
perfect only lacking in… foreign investment. As the BBC so wonderfully 
summarized it: the sale of all state industries except for oil and other natural 
resources. Basically, that means the privatization of water, electricity, 
communications, transportation, health… The BBC calls it a “surprise”… why 
were we not surprised?166 
 
Riverbend makes an important contribution to the contemporary coverage of the occupation by 
challenging the narratives dominant in Western media, saying she is not surprised by the 
privatization. She also calls her readers’ attention to some of the most imperialistic policies 
pursued by coalition leader Paul Bremer III and the US government by extension. The first is the 
amount of money that went to US companies to rebuild infrastructure in Iraq, second is 
privatization and rapidly opening the Iraqi economy to foreign investment. These economic 
policies impoverished many Iraqis, and especially women heads of households.167 Riverbend 
resisted the occupation’s corruption and imperialistic practices by calling her US audience’s 
attention to them.  
 Riverbend also urged her readers to consider the gendered impacts of the occupation and 
the new Iraqi government. In a post from January 2004, titled “Shari’a and Family Law,” 
Riverbend breaks down the implications of Resolution 137, a bill passed by the IGC in 
December 2003 which was the predecessor to Article 41 of the 2005 constitution. Resolution 137 
would have fully replaced Iraq’s the PSC from 1959, which remained one of the most 
progressive in the region through its considerable legal protections for women. Like Article 41, 
Resolution 137’s PSC would have been more sectarian and decentralized than the former, 
 
166 Riverbend, Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog From Iraq, 76-7. The first and last set of ellipses are Riverbend’s, the 
middle is my own. 
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allowing local leaders to grant women whichever rights they felt were appropriate based on their 
personal interpretation of Shari’a, or Islamic law.168 Here is what Riverbend had to say: 
The news [of this resolution] has barely been covered by Western or even Arab 
media… This latest decision is going to be catastrophic for females– we’re going 
backwards. Don’t get me wrong– pure Islamic law according to the Quran and the 
Prophet gives women certain unalterable, nonnegotiable rights. The problem 
arises when certain clerics decide to do their own interpretations of these laws 
(and just about *anyone* can make themselves a cleric these days)… This is 
going to mean more chaos than we already have to deal with. We’ve come to 
expect chaos in the streets… but chaos in the courts and judicial system too?169 
 
By mentioning the lack of coverage Riverbend makes her intervention clear– she means to raise 
her readers’ awareness of this issue. She does so with considerable skill, not assuming any 
knowledge of Islam, Iraqi society, or Iraqi history. Through accessible language Riverbend 
makes her position easy to understand, and the passion which permeates her writing is an appeal 
to the hearts of her audience. She also explicitly notes the lack of coverage by Western or Arab 
media, prompting her readers to consider the bias of their news sources. Through blog posts like 
this, Riverbend resisted state oppression and imperialism in the form of biased media coverage. 
She was one of many Iraqi women who adapted to the rapidly changing circumstances during the 
US occupation, and part of a shift that took place among Iraqi women’s resistance. 
Conclusion 
 During the US occupation, Iraqi women took resistance methods seen during the 
Sanctions Period, adapted them to the present circumstances, and even innovated new forms of 
resistance. Impoverished Iraqi women were more likely to take their survival tactics beyond 
Iraq’s borders. The end of a one-party system left women free to take their political activism 
 
168 Al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind of Liberation?, 133-4.  
169 Riverbend, Baghdad Burning, 187-8 (the first two ellipses are my own, the last set is Riverbend’s). I should add 
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outside the control of the government, and new technology gave some Iraqi women the ability to 
write their resistance through blogs. Unfortunately, among this adaptation and innovation, a 
more extreme form of violence was taking root in Iraq. In the next chapter I will turn to the 
extremist violence perpetrated by ISIL and discuss the ways Iraqi women changed their 




Hyper-Patriarchy and Violence Under ISIL 
(2012-2019) 
 It was August 3, 2014, two months after ISIL,170 or the so-called “Islamic State,” 
captured Mosul, one of the largest cities in Iraq. Adiba Qasim and her family were asleep on the 
roof of their house to avoid the summer heat, a standard practice among many Iraqi families. 
Adiba and her family awoke to a call from one of their relatives, who delivered an urgent 
message: “the Islamic State at 3:00 in the morning attacked us. Many people have been killed 
and it is very difficult. So, run away. Get out of your house!” 171 Adiba’s father was resistant, but 
she forced him and the rest of her family into a car, and they managed to leave town before ISIL 
arrived. It was the last time Adiba would step foot in her childhood home. She lost up to 70 
members of her extended family in ISIL’s genocide of Iraq’s Yezidi population.172 
 ISIL’s military campaign in the summer of 2014 shocked the world and exposed the 
frailty of the post-2003 Iraqi regime. Adiba Qasim’s life has been extremely difficult since that 
summer, and yet, in her words, she was one of the lucky ones. ISIL used discredited extremist 
interpretations of Sunni Islam to justify crimes against humanity, and it brought death and 
destruction to the areas it controlled. Unlike its predecessor, al-Qaeda, which was a decentralized 
organization with a focus on attacking imperialist nations like the United States, ISIL constructed 
 
170 There are many names associated with this group, including its Arabic acronym, Daesh, and its most popular 
acronym, ISIS. To make this paper both as accurate and accessible as possible, I have chosen to use ISIL because it 
is likely more familiar to my readers than “Daesh,” and the translation “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” is more 
accurate than “Iraq and Syria.” This is because the Arabic word “al-Shams” refers not to Syria the nation-state, but 
Syria as a region, or what we call the “Levant” in English.  
171 Adiba Qasim, “Home Is the People Around You,” interview by Melissa Fleming, UN Refugee Agency, August 
19, 2019. Accessed January 11, 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/awakeatnight/season-2-episode-7-adiba-qasim/.  
172 Jane Ferguson, “Yazidi women struggle to return to daily life after enduring Islamic State brutality,” PBS, 
December 18, 2017, accessed March 12, 2020. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/yazidi-women-struggle-to-
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an organized, hierarchical military and system of governance. 173 Its main target was not the US 
or other imperialist nations, but the “near-enemy” which meant Shi’a Muslims, religious 
minorities such as Christians, Sabeans, and Yezidis, and even Sunni Muslims who did not adhere 
to ISIL’s twisted vision of Islam.174  
 Women of non-Muslim religious minorities, like Adiba, were subject to the worst of 
ISIL’s violence, and for that reason they are the most visible in this chapter. The sexual violence 
weaponized against them, however, was not a new phenomenon in Iraq. As noted by Nadje al-
Ali, it was not uncommon for the Ba’th regime to use sexual violence to assert its masculinity 
and control over various Iraqi communities during times of war and peace. During the US 
occupation, gender-based violence was institutionalized by occupiers and occupied alike. ISIL’s 
divergence was in its ideological justification of rape and forced marriage, and its openness in 
tying these practices to its ideas of masculinity and what al-Ali calls “a hyper-patriarchal system 
of rigid and polarized gender roles.”175  
 The goal of this chapter is to contextualize the rise of ISIL in Iraq and Syria, examine its 
religious philosophy towards women, and discuss the survival tactics used by Iraqi women living 
under ISIL and the ways other Iraqi women resisted ISIL. I begin by traveling back to the 
months leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and I argue that the United States and the new 
Iraqi political elite contributed to the conditions necessary for ISIL to appear and build a proto-
state in 2014 and share responsibility for its emergence. The following section deals with ISIL’s 
religious doctrine, and how that informed its treatment of women. I argue that ISIL’s religious 
 
173 Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of the Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution, (New York: Verso, 2015), 
55) 
174 Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 23-5. 
175 Nadje al-Ali, “Sexual violence in Iraq: Challenges for transnational feminist politics,” European Journal of 
Women’s Studies 25, no. 1 (2018): 21 
 56 
ruling legalized rape and forced marriage and were intended to create a hyper-patriarchal society 
in which women had little to no freedoms. In the final sections I examine the ways Iraqi women 
resisted and survived ISIL’s violence. Some women adapted forms of resistance seen in previous 
chapters, such as writing and activism, to be effective against ISIL. Others took the newer path 
of military resistance. Iraqi women subjected to the worst of ISIL’s violence resisted through 
finding ways to survive, reduce the likelihood of rape and forced marriage, and escape captivity. 
(1) Creating ISIL: US Imperialism and Iraqi Corruption 
 While it may seem like this chapter is somewhat divergent from the previous two, which 
focused on US imperialism and the Iraqi state, the truth is that ISIL could not have formed 
without the US occupation, or the sectarian policies of the Iraqi government that the US left 
behind. The purpose of this section is to show how the US occupation gave al-Qaeda Iraq, ISIL’s 
predecessor, the opportunity to form, and how the US radicalized many of ISIL’s future leaders. 
I then argue Iraq’s sectarian government alienated its Sunni population, some of which ISIL 
temporarily allied itself with in order to take power in 2014. This is the first section of this thesis 
in which Iraqi women do not take a prominent role, though I believe it is important to include 
this history for the sake of continuity. Therefore, before we discuss Iraqi women in the 2010s, we 
need to look at the life of a Jordanian man born in the 1960s. 
 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was able to found al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) because of the collapse of 
the Iraqi state after the US invasion in 2003. Zarqawi was born in Jordan in 1966 and converted 
to the radical and fundamentalist Salafi-Jihadist brand of Sunni Islam as a teenager. In 1999 he 
gained the monetary support of al-Qaeda Central (AQC) and created Jihadist training camps in 
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Iran.176 In February 2003, then Secretary of State Collin Powell justified the invasion of Iraq in 
part through a claim that Zarqawi and al-Qaeda were being harbored in Northern Iraq and even 
Baghdad.177 However, Zarqawi moved to Iraq for the first time in June 2003, three months after 
the US invasion.178 Political scientist Fawaz Gerges has called the US invasion the “most 
important variable in the emergence of [AQI] and its subsequent rebirth as [ISIL].”179 This is due 
to the US dismantling Iraq’s state institutions, the dismissal of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi 
soldiers, and the institutionalization of sectarian politics.180 AQI used the chaos immediately 
following the US invasion to its advantage, and over the next decade it would recruit Iraqi men 
radicalized by the US occupation.  
The United States contributed to the radicalization of what would later become ISIL’s 
leaders through torture and abuse in the prisons it ran in Iraq. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader 
of ISIL until his death in October 2019, and his top military strategists all spent time in US-run 
prisons during the Occupation.181 Al-Baghdadi’s biography is difficult to piece together, but 
scholars agree that he did not become a Salafi-Jihadist until he went to the US-run Camp Bucca 
around 2004 or 2005.182 A report from the International Committee of the Red Cross describes 
standard practices in Camp Bucca, saying a regular day involved prolonged isolation while 
hooded, and “interrogation” tactics included being left in a stress position for several hours, and 
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other forms torture.183 It was not uncommon for men like al-Baghdadi or former Ba‘thist military 
officers to join AQI after leaving US-run prisons such as Camp Bucca, as they were often 
converted to Salafi-Jihadism while detained.184  
Al-Baghdadi joined AQI around 2006, around the same time that Zarqawi was killed by a 
US airstrike and AQI fell out of favor among Sunni communities.185 When al-Baghdadi became 
the leader of AQI in 2010, it was at its weakest since Zarqawi founded it in 2004, but sectarian 
Iraqi politics and a proxy war in Syria allowed AQI to re-emerge as ISIL in 2013. Prime Minister 
Nouri al-Maliki was elected in 2006, and his increasingly authoritarian and sectarian policies 
alienated Iraq’s Sunni constituency to the point that many saw armed resistance as their only 
viable option. For example, in 2010 al-Maliki barred 511 politicians, mostly Sunni men, from 
participating in that year’s election. After losing the election, al-Maliki blamed a Ba‘thist plot to 
re-take the country, and formed a government anyway.186 In the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring, 
Iraqis all over the country joined in anti-government protests, and a new insurgency formed in 
the Northeast.187 This area of Iraq has a Sunni majority, and shares a border with Syria.  
AQI took advantage of the unrest in Iraq and Syria by becoming temporary allies with 
less radical militias and even Gulf states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia. After a period of peaceful 
protests against Syria’s secular dictator who belongs to a Shi’i sub-sect of Islam, the Syrian civil 
war began in 2011 as a fight between a corrupt regime and its constituency, though foreign 
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intervention soon led to a proxy war involving several regional and global powers.188 AQI 
invested heavily in a Jihadi group fighting in Syria, and eventually absorbed it, establishing itself 
as ISIL in 2013. ISIL became especially powerful during in 2013 through the arms and financial 
support it received from Sunni-majority countries that wanted to see the fall of Syria’s Shi’a 
government. It used this power to win influence over the insurgency in Northeastern Iraq, and by 
2014 ISIL was prepared for a major military campaign. 
 In January 2014 ISIL took control of Fallujah, a city just forty miles West of Baghdad. 189 
By the summer, a small army of ISIL fighters had taken the city of Mosul, one of Iraq’s largest 
cities. They also took Tikrit, Samarra, Ramadi, and Baquba that summer, all of which are Sunni-
majority cities in Western Iraq or near Baghdad. ISIL pushed into Kurdish territory in the North, 
though it never took any major cities official designated as part of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government. Amidst this chaos, the Iraqi government was frozen by ethnosectarian grudges and 
incompetence. Generals were airlifted to safety in Baghdad, and the Iraqi army disintegrated, 
leaving behind weapons, equipment, and large swathes of territory for ISIL.190 
As noted in Chapter 2, it is common for “occupied” men to feel emasculated and 
humiliated by the violence of occupation. They often reassert their masculinity through control 
over, or violence against, “occupied” women.191 Given the torture they experienced at prisons 
like Camp Bucca, one can imagine men like al-Baghdadi and former Ba‘thist military officers 
becoming extremely violent towards women in order to cope with their experiences at US-run 
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prisons. ISIL’s publications and religious rulings suggest its leaders, military and religious, all 
encouraged violence against women and hyper-patriarchal practices.  
 
Iraqi territory as of May 2015, after some areas were recaptured by Iraqi and Kurdish forces.192 
 
(2) “Girls get peddled like barrels of petrol”: ISIL and Women 
 One of the most disturbing aspects of ISIL is how organized they were during the height 
of their power. There was no improvisation. All of their policies originated from their faulty 
interpretations of the Qur’an and were intended to mimic life under the Prophet Muhammad.193 
This was also true in regard to women. In this section I will examine ISIL documents which 
illustrate their views of what a woman should be, and how to treat a woman who does not 
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conform to that standard. I then turn to their policies as they were implemented, and the way 
women were governed under ISIL.  
 In the official English magazine of ISIL, Dabiq, an article from 2014 explains ISIL’s 
position on the enslavement of minority women. Dabiq propaganda and recruitment tool 
designed to make ISIL fighters look glorious, and their enemies weak and perverted. In issue 4, 
the cover article is titled “the Revival of Slavery Before the Hour.” It deals especially with the 
Yezidi Kurds, practitioners of a religion that predates Islam, whom they call “devil worshippers.” 
They argue that because Yezidi women do not practice an Abrahamic religion, they are subject 
to enslavement.194 They quote commentary written by Salafi scholars, for example “Allah 
marvels at people who enter Jannah [heaven] in chains,”195 which is supposed to mean that by 
enslaving non-believers and forcing them to convert, the ISIL fighter secures them a spot in 
heaven. Through quotations such as these, ISIL argues that they are, in fact, helping Yezidi 
women.  
 Women enslaved by ISIL were forcibly married to ISIL fighters, and subject to rape and 
torture. An ISIL pamphlet discussing the rules and treatment of enslaved women was published 
on a pro-ISIL twitter account, and later confirmed as authentic by Human Rights Watch, says the 
following:  
If she is a virgin, he [her master] can have intercourse with her immediately after 
taking possession of her. However, if she isn’t, her uterus must be purified…. It is 
permissible to buy, sell, or give as a gift female captives and slaves, for they are 
merely property, which can be disposed of as long as that doesn’t cause [the 
Muslim ummah] any harm or damage…. It is permissible to beat the female slave 
as a darb ta’deeb [disciplinary beating].196 
 
194 It should be noted that Christians, despite being an Abrahamic religion, were (and are) also subject to sexual 
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This pamphlet perfectly summarizes ISIL’s view of women who don’t conform to their 
expectations: objects to be bought, used, and sold. In a pricing guide discovered by UN Special 
Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Bangura, ISIL recommends girls under 
age nine be sold for $165, girls between ten and nineteen for $124, and women over twenty for 
even less.197 Disturbingly, sexual slavery served as an extremely effective recruitment tool for 
ISIL during the height of its power, especially for young men from conservative backgrounds.198  
While ISIL used its religious doctrine to justify violence, sexual and otherwise, against 
non-Muslim religious minorities, its rank-and-file did not differentiate between religious or 
ethnic sects. Sunni Arab women, the only ethnosectarian group not considered heretical by ISIL, 
were also subject to forced marriage and rape by ISIL soldiers. Human Rights Watch 
interviewed several Sunni Arab women who had lived under ISIL for either several weeks or 
months, of whom  
[one] woman said an ISIS fighter, her cousin, forced her to marry him and then 
raped her. [Another] woman said that ISIS fighters destroyed her home as 
punishment after her husband escaped ISIS and tried to forcibly marry her. Five 
of the six women said that ISIS fighters beat them.199 
 
While these women were not sold into sexual slavery like Yezidi women, they were 
victims of similar forms of sexual violence by ISIL. The fact that this was true for Sunni 
women, who were closest to ISIL’s religious views, suggests all Iraqi women living 
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under ISIL were at risk of enduring traumatizing violence. It also suggests ISIL cared 
more about political power than religious sect. 200 
In addition to sexual violence, Iraqi women who lived in areas captured by ISIL, 
such as the city of Mosul, were subject to other forms of violence such as lack of food 
and healthcare. In the 2015-16 growing season, the agricultural land surrounding Mosul 
saw a 18% decrease in harvest output.201 This is reflected by an anonymous Mosulawi 
woman, who told the UN Population Fund, “when ISIL fighters came to our town, they 
stayed for two years. We faced hunger and lack of medicines.”202 As noted by this 
woman, healthcare was also a problem. When ISIL captured Mosul in 2014, they burned 
down al-Khansa hospital and closed most of the cities maternity wards.203 ISIL’s 
restrictions on unmarried women and men touching and being alone together meant some 
doctors would not see women patients for fear of punishment.204 For many of the women 
who escaped ISIL territory, violence against them continued in other forms, like being 
placed in a refugee camp where they could not leave to seek medical attention,205 or 
being tricked into interviews with insensitive foreign journalists.206 
Women who lived under ISIL, including women who supported it, had to follow hyper-
patriarchal rules that placed them under the complete control of men. It was forbidden for a 
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woman to be unmarried because, by ISIL’s worldview, an unmarried woman who is not having 
children is not doing her part to further the cause of the Jihad. Women widowed by ISIL fighters 
had new marriages arranged by ISIL’s marriage bureau.207 This kept them firmly under the 
control of their husband, who had the legal and religious right to beat her whenever he felt 
necessary, as mentioned above. In addition, women were not allowed to travel anywhere without 
a male companion, usually her husband or someone in her immediate family.208 These 
restrictions kept women from acting autonomously, and demonstrate that ISIL sought to make all 
women subordinates, regardless of their allegiance. With ISIL’s rise to power and its treatment 
of women established, let us turn to the voices of the Iraqi women who resisted ISIL’s violence.  
(3) Iraqi Women Resisting ISIL: From Humanitarian Work to Armed Resistance 
 Adiba Qasim was born in 1993 to a Yezidi family in a village near the Syrian border. 
Adiba’s birth was not recognized by the Iraqi state because her mother was still officially 
married to her first husband, who died in the Iran-Iraq war. She attended school from outside a 
window, listening in on lessons and borrowing schoolbooks from her friends. Eventually, she 
was recognized as an Iraqi citizen, and in 2013 she passed the entrance exams to a university in 
Mosul.209 Adiba was able to make the best of an unfortunate situation through her 
resourcefulness and ingenuity. The violence perpetrated by ISIL was a much more extreme 
situation in which Adiba once again called upon her resourcefulness and ingenuity to resist, and 
many Iraqi women like her did the same. In this section I will argue that Iraqi women resisted 
ISIL through their activism, writing, and militancy, a form of resistance unique to this decade.  
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Adiba began resisting ISIL first by learning English almost as soon as the crisis began in 
2014. Adiba and her family were fortunate to escape ISIL’s grasp and resettle at a refugee camp 
in Turkey. Upon arrival, she noticed that very few people were able to translate Kurmanji, the 
dialect spoken by most Yezidis, to English, the language spoken by most of the NGO workers 
and journalists at the refugee camp. She also noticed that many of the women at the camp 
seemed to be more distressed after meeting with NGO workers and journalists than they had 
been before. “I decided to learn English so I could work with women [who escaped ISIL]” 210 
Adiba told Al-Jazeera. At first she followed around an NGO worker, picking up on English 
words here and there, even using scraps of paper and cigarette cartons to practice reading and 
writing in English. She worked hard and her English improved at a rapid pace.211 
 At first, Adiba used her English to help elevate the stories of Yezidi women. Speaking to 
her motivations, Adiba said, “I was lucky; I escaped, but it could have been me who was raped 
or tortured like many Yezidi women, and I feel a responsibility to tell their stories.”212 Historian 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot has said silences enter histories at four critical junctures, the first of 
which is fact collection.213 By learning English to help translate the stories of Yezidi women for 
mass audiences, Adiba made sure the facts of the Yezidi genocide by ISIL were properly 
documented. In documenting this genocide Adiba resisted ISIL, and the governments that 
contributed to its rise to power, like the US and Iraq. 
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Adiba also confronted foreign reporters who asked insensitive questions, saying 
“sometimes [reporters] ask questions like, ‘How many times have you been raped, or have you 
been pregnant?’ I tell them you have to have respect.”214 Through this work Adiba was resisting 
a different type of imperialism coming from the US, imperialism in the form of journalists who 
seek to profit off the suffering of black and brown women around the world. By demanding that 
the women being interviewed be treated with respect, Adiba was insisting that their lives held 
value beyond a potential news story. Unfortunately, Adiba had to leave Iraq for her safety in late 
2017, though she has made a new life for herself in Switzerland, where she studies law and 
continues with her humanitarian work.215  
Adiba is not alone in resisting violence against Iraqi women from afar. Dunya Mikhail 
wrote a book to elevate the stories of Iraqi women resisting ISIL from a suburb of Detroit, 
Michigan. Dunya Mikhail is an Iraqi Christian woman who emigrated from Iraq in the 1990s 
because her journalistic work resulted in persecution by the Ba‘th regime.216 Her book, The 
Beekeeper, gets its title from an Iraqi man, referred to only as Abdullah, a former beekeeper who 
put Mikhail in contact with the women she interviewed for this book. He also helped her 
translate Kurdish to Arabic. From her home in Michigan, Mikhail woke up before dawn to call 
Abdullah and discuss his work as a part of an organization that smuggled women kidnapped by 
ISIL to safety.217 Mikhail did many phone interviews with Abdullah’s help, and in 2016 she 
travelled to Northern Iraq, where Abdullah lives and works, to meet with him and interview a 
few women in person.218 
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The women in The Beekeeper had a range of tactics to resist ISIL, including ways to 
make their time living under ISIL more bearable, and strategies used to coordinate an escape. 
Mikhail interviewed Badia, a Yezidi woman who was enslaved by ISIL for several months, 
about how Badia survived and escaped. Several of the tricks she adopted were to avoid being 
bought by ISIL fighters. Badia went a month without bathing.  
They ordered us to bathe, but I went into the bathroom and came back out again 
without washing. I knew they were going to come and smell me, and cleanliness 
was dangerous in that situation. A month passed, and every day I began to smell 
worse. I didn’t even wash my face despite the fact that my eyes were itching from 
crying so much.219  
 
To avoid being raped by the man who eventually enslaved her, nicknamed “the Emir,” 
Badia said that she was pregnant, which bought her at least a day until he could get a pregnancy 
test. She used that time to her advantage, and tried to escape: 
When the Emir left in the morning, we had to figure out what to do about the 
guard. I told him: “We don’t have any bread. We want to buy some.” He said: 
“I’ll go get it for you,” and he left without locking the door. We made a run for it 
as soon as he had been gone for a few minutes. But moments later we wandered 
into a group of [ISIL fighters] on the street. They said: “Why aren’t you dressed 
properly? Who are you with?”… They took us back to his house.220 
 
When the Emir returned home, she told him that they weren’t trying to escape, just getting some 
air, and that’s why she hadn’t been wearing the Islamic clothing prescribed by ISIL. Lies like 
this reduced the number of times Badia was beaten and raped by the Emir. Women like Badia, 
who were enslaved by ISIL, took every opportunity to reduce the amount of suffering they went 
through, whether it was to put off being sold or delay being raped. Given the horrific situation 
they were faced with, harm reduction and survival became a way to resist. With the help of 
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Abdullah, Badia eventually escaped and shared her story with Mikhail, who shared Badia’s 
strength with the world.  
 In terms of escaping ISIL, many women in The Beekeeper had a similar story because 
Abdullah and his network had a prescribed way of carrying out their rescue missions, but they 
offer insight into the ways Iraqi women escaped ISIL. Some called a relative who relayed their 
location to Abdullah and his team. Others, like Badia, memorized a number which was 
circulating among the Iraqi women who were detained together before being sold, and called it to 
set up their escape.221 Stories such as Badia’s in The Beekeeper show that Iraqi Yezidis escaped 
ISIL through sharing information that would help them escape.  
Dunya Mikhail is known for her poetry collections, but The Beekeeper makes the voices 
of Iraqi women enslaved by ISIL easy to relate to and sympathize with. The Beekeeper blends 
Mikhail’s life with the stories told to her by Abdullah and the women she interviews. Mikhail 
occasionally offers a stanza of poetry thematically connected to the narrative of an Iraqi woman 
who survived ISIL’s abuse.222 Rather than being narrated by Mikhail, the stories of women like 
Badia are told from the first-person perspective, which has the effect of bringing the reader 
closer to their stories. Through “I” statements, the reader is forced into the shoes of these 
women, however uncomfortable that may be. Mikhail also includes pictures of the women in the 
book, making them easier to identify with.  
In addition, her effective literary style, Mikhail’s translation of the Beekeeper into 
English brought the stories of Iraqi women to the global stage. By translating her book into 
English, Mikhail brought these stories to the world’s most widely-spoken language, making them 
even more accessible. It also put the stories of Iraqi women into the language spoken by many of 
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the people responsible for creating ISIL who work or worked in the US government. The 
Beekeeper has been covered by media outlets like PBS and The New Yorker, both of whom 
brought in Mikhail for an interview.223 Mikhail’s wonderful translation and the media coverage 
show that she was successful in bringing the stories of Iraqi women who survived life under ISIL 
to a large audience. While most of the women in The Beekeeper are Yezidi, ISIL’s violence 
affected women of all sects and ethnicities (as I established above).  
Interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch show that many Sunni women living in 
ISIL-occupied territory also had to escape rape and forced marriage by ISIL fighters. Unlike 
Yezidi women, they were not kidnapped and sold into sexual slavery. However, many Sunni 
women experienced sexual assault, especially if they were single, widowed, or their husbands 
fled to avoid being recruited. A woman under the pseudonym Hanan told HRW, “the same guy 
raped me every day for [a] month”224 until her father payed ISIL ransom money, 500 dollars and 
a car. She and her father then escaped to a refugee camp in Iraqi Kurdistan. Another woman, 
Miriam, said she “agreed, telling them to come the following day, and went into hiding that 
night.” After three months Miriam was able to get past an ISIL checkpoint and resettled in 
Kirkuk.225 While HRW does not specify how Hanan or Miriam escaped, their report suggests 
that Iraqi women, regardless of sect, resisted ISIL through fleeing ISIL territory and by delaying 
rape and forced marriage through lies. 
Other women resisted ISIL through acts like seeking healthcare despite gendered 
restrictions. As discussed above, ISIL destroyed many hospitals,226 and did not allow women to 
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be touched by or left alone with a male doctor.227 Rather than risk the three day wait to see a 
female doctor, women from Hawija told Human Rights Watch that they would use tricks to seek 
aid from a male doctor. One strategy was to find a doctor who would agree to examine them 
from across the room, or to have a male relative visit the doctor on their behalf, and describe 
their symptoms.228 None of their techniques were a replacement for proper healthcare, but by 
seeking some form of medical care despite ISIL’s restrictions, Iraqi women asserted their needs 
and humanity, resisting ISIL’s hyper-patriarchal rules.  
Some Iraqi women had the opportunity to resist ISIL through armed resistance. In Iraqi 
Kurdistan, women have been fighting in the Peshmerga, or Kurdish military, since the 1960s, 
though not openly until the 1990s.229 Even then, Iraqi Kurdish women were usually assigned 
security duties, and rarely saw combat.230 However, this changed after ISIL formed, as units 
made up entirely of women began fighting against ISIL on the frontlines. Dilbreen, a 17-year-old 
Iraqi woman told a British reporter, “I joined the [Peshmerga] voluntarily… to help defend the 
Kurds, the Arabs, the Christians, and all [Iraqi] nationals.”231 Dilbreen’s decision to volunteer for 
these reasons show that, despite the division encouraged by ISIL and the US occupation, there 
are still Iraqi women who identify and are willing to sacrifice their lives for Iraqis of other sects 
and ethnicities. 
Other Iraqi Kurdish women said fighting ISIL was empowering. Berryton, a sniper in an 
all-women Peshmerga unit, was interview by Martin Himel, a white American man with PBS, 
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about why she fights. Berryton said, “when I fight against [ISIL], I feel stronger, empowered, 
because when they see women, they go weak at the knees. According to their belief, they must 
not be killed by a woman.”232 She also says fighting against ISIL as a woman is inherently 
subversive: “even if you don’t kill them, you are fighting against their mentality.”233 Iraqi 
Kurdish women like Berryton were empowered by the fear they struck into ISIL fighters, and 
perhaps also by the fact that they were pushing new boundaries in Iraqi Kurdistan. After all, they 
were the first units made up exclusively of women to fight on the frontline. Through their armed 
resistance, women in Iraqi Kurdistan undermined ISIL’s worldview.  
Conclusion 
 In the past decade, Iraqi women adapted their political activism and writing to resist 
ISIL’s violent extremism. In the North, Kurdish women took to militant resistance for the first 
time. And Iraqi women who faced the worst of ISIL’s violence found ways to survive and limit 
the amount of violence they endured. With this in mind, it is necessary to re-visit the present 
circumstances in Iraq and women’s place within them. 
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Conclusion: 
Making Sense of Past and Present 
 When I began writing this thesis over a year ago, I did not know that there would be an 
attempted revolution in the Fall of 2019. Almost a decade after the withdrawal of the US-led 
coalition army, Iraqi people organized en masse in a democratic uprising that challenged the 
ethnosectarianism and corruption of the post-2003 regime. As I conducted research on the past 
three decades, Iraqi women like Ban, mentioned in my introduction, were occupying Baghdad’s 
Tahrir, or “Liberation,” Square and demanding radical change. They were building on a long 
legacy of Iraqi women resisting imperialism, repression, and extremism. Ban said she was 
protesting political, tribal, and religious institutions that “limit women’s role in society.”234  
 The goal of this thesis has been, in many ways, to contextualize Ban’s statement. In the 
years since 1990, Iraqi women have endured the violence of imperialism, repression, and 
extremism. I have argued that Iraqi women have resisted this violence through their survival, 
political mobilizations, writing, and more recently, through their militancy. During the dramatic 
transformations of the past three decades, from UN sanctions to ISIL, Iraqi women constantly 
adapted their resistance methods to work in the present moment.  
 The first major shift in Iraqi society took place in 1990 with the passage of UN sanctions, 
coupled Operation Desert Storm in 1991. These were devastating for Iraqi women because of 
their effects on the welfare state and civilian infrastructure, respectively. It became much harder 
for Iraqi women to find a job and receive quality healthcare. At the same time, Saddam 
Hussein’s government instituted tribo-Islamic policies that empowered patriarchal tribal and 
religious leaders. In general, Iraqi women survived the economic collapse through their 
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participation in the informal economy, though what this looked like depended on one’s class 
status. Women’s political actions were limited by the Ba‘th regime during this decade, but there 
is evidence that women took opportunities to attend state-approved protests against UN 
sanctions. A more common form of resistance was writing, be it poetry to ease one’s soul, or 
prose intended to elevate the stories of other Iraqi women.  
 In 2003, the US invasion and military occupation of Iraq caused the collapse of the Iraqi 
state and a worsening of the economic crisis that began under sanctions. The US’s use of “shock 
therapy” economics pushed more women out of the workforce than sanctions had, and the 
widespread violence followed by the state’s collapse made it unsafe for many women to leave 
their homes. As the new government formed, Iraqi women were politically marginalized, and the 
new political elite made frequent attempts to strip women of their rights. Iraqi women continued 
to survive the economic collapse through their participation in the informal economy, and in this 
decade some women travelled to neighboring countries like Jordan, finding work as refugees. 
Within Iraq, the end of the one-party system meant Iraqi women could form non-governmental 
organizations for the first time, and many middle-class Iraqi women became activists. Also new 
to Iraqi women’s resistance was the “blog” format, which was taken advantage of by women like 
Riverbend, who wrote to a US audience to inform them of the gendered impacts of the 
occupation.  
 In just over two years after the US’s withdrawal, ISIL took control of almost a third of 
Iraq. It was able to do so in large part because of US imperialism and the post-2003 Iraqi regime. 
The chaotic aftermath of the 2003 invasion gave al-Qaeda the opportunity to establish itself, and 
in the early 2010s the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi government alienated Iraq’s Sunni 
communities. ISIL took advantage of this to establish itself and turned on anyone who did not 
 74 
adhere to its worldview. ISIL encouraged its fighters to rape and treat women like property, 
especially Yezidi women who were sold into sexual slavery. Much like the US before it, ISIL 
destroyed hospitals and left Iraqi women without many essential services. Iraqi women survived 
and resisted ISIL through finding ways to reduce the violence against them until they could 
escape. They also adapted strategies like political activism and writing to aid and elevate the 
stories of ISIL’s victims. Finally, A new form of resistance appeared in the Kurdish Peshmerga 
with the establishment of all-women regiments that fought against ISIL on the frontlines. 
Today, many of Iraqi women’s biggest challenges remain the same. In January 2020, 
amid the uprisings, the US assassinated a top Iranian military officer on Iraqi soil. This act of 
imperialism created sectarian tensions among the formerly unified protests.235 While dedicated 
protesters continue to occupy Tahrir square, the uprisings have been effectively suspended by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The corrupt Iraqi political elite maintain their hold on power, and militias 
continue to threaten and kill Iraqi women activists.236 While ISIL has lost all of its territory in 
Iraq and Syria, it continues to operate underground, and has called for its followers to carry out 
more attacks during the pandemic.237 Moreover, the pandemic and the plummeting price of oil, 
which provide the Iraqi government with 90% of its revenue, are creating another economic 
crisis. This time, COVID-19 and social distancing mean the informal economy may not be a 
viable option for Iraqi women.238 It is unclear what the future holds for Iraqi women, but if 
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history is any indicator, Iraqi women will find ways to adapt their survival tactics and resistance 
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